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Abstract
Consent governs innumerable everyday social interactions, including sex, medical exams, the
use of property, and economic transactions. Yet little is known about how ordinary people
reason about the validity of consent. Across the domains of sex, medicine, and police entry,
Study 1 showed that when agents lack autonomous decision-making capacities, participants
are less likely to view their consent as valid; however, failing to exercise this capacity and
deciding in a nonautonomous way did not reduce consent judgments. Study 2 found that
specific and concrete incapacities reduced judgments of valid consent, but failing to exercise
these specific capacities did not, even when the consenter makes an irrational and inauthentic
decision. Finally, Study 3 showed that the effect of autonomy on judgments of valid consent
carries important downstream consequences for moral reasoning about the rights and
obligations of third parties, even when the consented-to action is morally wrong. Overall, these
findings suggest that laypeople embrace a normative, domain-general concept of valid consent
that depends consistently on the possession of autonomous capacities, but not on the exercise
of these capacities. Autonomous decisions and autonomous capacities thus play divergent roles
in moral reasoning about consent interactions: while the former appears relevant for assessing
the wrongfulness of consented-to acts, the latter plays a role in whether consent is regarded as
authoritative and therefore as transforming moral rights.
Keywords:
consent; moral reasoning; autonomy; ownership; moral psychology; experimental philosophy
1. Introduction
Consent is morally transformative and suffuses our everyday moral and social lives. Valid
consent makes the difference between permissible sex and rape; between a medical exam and
assault; between entering a person’s home and trespass; between an economic transaction and
theft. We need consent to include participants in research, to collect private information, to
borrow things, to exchange money, to perform medical procedures, to cut someone’s hair, and
to enter into legally binding contracts. The importance of consent is reflected in extensive
treatments of valid consent in moral philosophy and the law, as well as in biomedical ethics
and psychiatry (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Appelbaum &
Roth, 1982).
These fields emphasize that a person who assents—for example, by saying “yes”—does
not necessarily give morally transformative or legally valid consent. For instance, most
philosophers, legal scholars and medical ethicists do not consider the assent of people who are
coerced, under duress, severely intoxicated, underage, intellectually disabled, or otherwise
incapacitated to constitute valid consent (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013, Chapter 3;
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Dougherty, 2019; Hurd, 1996; Pugh, 2020; Wertheimer, 2003). Thus, the received view in
these fields is that consent is valid only if it is autonomous (Beauchamp, 2010).
Yet, the idea that consent must be autonomous is inherently ambiguous. It could mean that
the consenter must be autonomous in the sense of having the capacity to make autonomous
decisions. Alternatively, it could mean that the consenter must exercise this capacity and in
fact make an autonomous decision. Note that one can possess a capacity, though one does not
exercise it. Thus, someone might possess the mathematical capacity to work out the answer to
“24 x 7,” but that doesn’t mean they will exercise it: perhaps, instead of working out the answer,
they might simply guess. Similarly, a competent adult can possess the capacity to engage in
autonomous decision-making, but their decision to consent could fail to be autonomous if they
don’t exercise this capacity: they could act whimsically or impulsively; give in to a fleeting
emotional reaction; not think things through properly; or give in to pressure from others to say
‘yes’ to something they don’t really want to do.
The present studies address the understudied question of how people reason about the
validity of consent by investigating whether autonomy plays an important role in ordinary
reasoning, and, if so, in what sense consent must be autonomous for it to be considered valid
and thus morally transformative. Specifically, must consent be the product of exercising
autonomous decision-making capacities (that is, be the product of rational and authentic
processes)? Or is it sufficient for consent to be given by an agent who possesses autonomous
decision-making capacities, even if they fail to exercise these capacities, resulting in a decision
that may be neither rational nor what the agent really wants?
Surprisingly little is known about how ordinary people reason about valid consent,
including its relationship to autonomy. Despite the pervasive importance of consent to social
life, its role in moral cognition has been relatively understudied. While ample social science
research investigates how people communicate about consent through both verbal and nonverbal means (e.g. Beres, 2014; Wignall, Stirling & Scoats, 2020), and how people reason
about violations involving nonconsensual interactions, as when a person verbally objects (e.g.
Gravelin, Biernat, & Bucher, 2019; Hammond, Berry, & Rodriguez, 2011; Niemi & Young,
2016; Peace & Valois, 2014; Whatley, 1996; Yndo & Zawacki, 2020; see Muehlenhard et al.,
2016, for an overview of social scientific research on sexual consent), few studies have
investigated the factors that underlie ordinary judgments concerning whether consent is valid.
Moreover, much of the existing psychological research on consent examines specialized
topics—most prominently, sexual consent (e.g. Beres, 2014; Jozkowski et al., 2014) and
informed consent (Bohns, in press)—rather than investigating consent as a domain-general
moral concept. Put simply, while much work in contemporary moral psychology has focused
on when “no” is taken to mean “no,” little research has focused on when “yes” is taken to mean
“yes.”
One exception is Sommers (2020). Sommers asked participants to evaluate scenarios
describing agents who give consent only because they have been intentionally deceived about
important facts (e.g., an agent gives sexual consent after the partner lies to them about not
having HIV; a buyer signs a sales contract after the seller lies about the product).
Surprisingly—and in contrast to treatments of deception in moral philosophy (Dougherty,
2013) and the law (Blum et al., 2021) according to which deception vitiates consent—Sommers
found that participants tend to judge that such interactions are consensual across a variety of
contexts. This finding raises the possibility that the ordinary concept of valid consent, and its
role in moral reasoning, may deviate starkly from academic treatments.
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Studying consent judgments is important for several reasons. First, prior theorizing
suggests that judgments of valid consent should play an important role in moral reasoning.
Literature in philosophy, law, and bioethics suggest that valid consent is normally required for
interactions with other people’s lives, bodies, or property to be considered permissible. For
instance, it’s very morally wrong to have sex with someone without their valid consent. Moral
philosophy and legal theory explain the importance of consent in terms of transformation: valid
consent transforms moral rights and corresponding obligations (Hohfeld, 1913; Hurd, 1996).
For instance, if A gives valid consent to sex with B, then A (temporarily) waives their
autonomy-based right to not be touched by B in this manner, and B is no longer under a
corresponding moral obligation to refrain from having sex with A. Consequently, if B has sex
with A, they don’t wrong A in virtue of violating this right. Of course, consensual sex can be
considered wrong or inappropriate for other reasons, such as adultery or incest (e.g. Haidt,
Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000; Lim and Roloff, 1999). But consent is considered a necessary
element for sex to be morally permissible. Furthermore, the granting of valid consent is thought
to affect the allocation of other rights and obligations, including those of innocent third parties.
For instance, whether or not police are obligated to arrest someone for sexual assault should
depend crucially on the validity of the sexual partner’s consent—not, for instance, on the moral
wrongness of violating moral norms against adultery. Thus, the ordinary concept of valid
consent may play an important role in reasoning about moral permissions and moral rights.
Second, ordinary reasoning about consent is likely to have practical implications for
consent policy in areas such as law, medicine, and educational campaigns (e.g., Beres, 2014;
Humphreys & Herold, 2003; Marg, 2020). If people’s ordinary concept of valid consent
misaligns with expert treatments and official policy, it may make it more likely that people
misunderstand, misapply, or simply disagree with policy, with implications for compliance and
trust in institutions that uphold these policies (Hosmer, 1995; Humphreys & Herold, 2003; see
also discussion in Muehlenhard et al., 2016).
Thirdly, the folk conception of consent may carry legal ramifications. Legal scholarship
and practice rely on understanding the “ordinary meaning” of legally relevant concepts,
including consent; thus there is increasing interest in the contribution of the cognitive scientific
study of ordinary concepts to legal theory in the emerging field of “experimental
jurisprudence” (Struchiner, Hannikainen, & de Almeida, 2020; Tobia, 2022, forthcoming).
Additionally, ethical attitudes influence juror verdicts (e.g. Peter-Hagene & Ratliff, 2020),
juries are empowered to decide whether valid consent has been granted in legal cases (Kahan,
2010; Rerick, Livingston, & Davis, 2019).
1.1. Prior empirical work on consent and moral rights
While few studies have investigated the folk concept of valid consent, prior
psychological research on adjacent concepts, such as ownership, suggests that consent may
play an important role in moral reasoning about people’s rights and obligations. For example,
when people attribute ownership of an object, they first determine whether it was acquired
consensually (e.g., through purchasing it or receiving it as a gift) or non-consensually (e.g., by
stealing), and only in the former cases do they judge the possessor to be the owner of the object
(Friedman, Neary, Defeyter & Malcolm, 2011). Once ownership is established, people infer
certain rights over the object, such as the right to keep it or the right to determine what happens
to it. From age 3, children discern that consent is important for determining ownership: they
assume that the person who forbids (or allows) others to use an object by withholding (or
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giving) permission is the owner of the object (Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009).
Correspondingly, non-owners are morally obliged to refrain from using an object owned by
someone else (Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009), taking it, or destroying it (Millar, Turri,
and Friedman, 2014)—unless they have the owner’s consent. Similarly, if Jack protests against
Tom playing with a toy, children object to Jack’s interference if the owner had given Tom
permission. Thus, children appear to think that consent affects whether or not a third party may
interfere (Schmidt, Rakozcy & Tomasello, 2013).
The foregoing research suggests that ownership rights are allocated as a function of
consent, but whether such allocations are affected by the validity of the consent has not been
directly investigated. If an owner grants permission in a non-autonomous fashion, will people
still draw inferences about people’s rights to use or interfere with the property?
1.2. The role of autonomy in judgments of valid consent: Two hypotheses
The concept of autonomy has been studied in the context of psychological wellbeing (Deci
& Ryan, 2009) and it has received widespread attention in the study of moral cognition:
perceptions of autonomy play an important role in folk reasoning about moral responsibility
(Feltz & Cova, 2014), free will (Vonasch, Baumeister, & Mele, 2018), ownership (Starmans
and Friedman, 2016), and rights of personal choice (Nucci & Lee, 1993). More generally,
autonomy-based reasoning may capture a distinct and cross-cultural domain of moral thought
(Graham et al, 2013; Neff, 2001; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Shweder et al, 1997).
According to the literature, individuals are autonomous if they can make decisions freely
and shape their lives according to their own values (e.g., Mele, 1995). Prior empirical work
reveals two components thought to be required for autonomy: (a) freedom from external
interference or constraints (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000; Espinosa & Starmans, 2020); and (b) the
possession of certain types of decision-making capacities (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014;
Beauchamp & Childress, 2013, Chapter 3; Starmans & Friedman, 2016; see also Gray, Young
& Waytz, 2012). The present studies focus on the latter: the decision-making capacities
involved in autonomous consent, setting aside external constraints or interference by others.
Autonomous decision-making capacities are thought to include capacities for rational
decision-making (e.g., the capacity to reason properly, to understand one’s options, to
appreciate the implications of a decision, and to make decisions on the basis of relevant
reasons) and authentic decision-making (e.g., the capacity to guide one’s decisions according
to personal values and desires that are truly one’s own; Baumeister & Monroe, 2014; Moye et
al., 2006; Starmans & Friedman, 2016). These twin concepts are reflected in the measures of
capacity (also known as “competence”) used in psychiatry and clinical ethics to assess an
individual’s ability to give valid consent to medical treatment or participation in research (e.g.,
Appelbaum & Roth, 1982).
Thus, the present studies investigate the following two hypotheses about the
relationship between the consenter’s autonomy and judgments of valid consent:
The Exercises Capacity Hypothesis: Whether the decision to consent is made in an
autonomous (rational, authentic) way determines whether a consenter is judged to have
given valid consent.
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The Mere Capacity Hypothesis: Whether or not a consenter possesses the capacity to
make autonomous (rational, authentic) decisions determines whether they are judged to
have given valid consent, irrespective of whether the decision to consent is in fact made
in an autonomous (rational, authentic) way.
According to the Exercises Capacity Hypothesis, what goes on in the agent’s mind when
they are making their decision is crucial: it matters that they in fact make their decision in an
autonomous way—not merely that they possess the capacity to do so. This hypothesis mirrors
the importance of an agent’s mental state for other kinds of moral reasoning (Chakroff &
Young, 2015).
If the Exercises Capacity Hypothesis is right, the relevance of autonomy to consent is
naturally explained in terms of the way it allows agents to make autonomous (i.e., rational,
authentic) decisions. For instance, a straightforward explanation for why people might care
whether a consenter is intoxicated would be that these impairments make it likely that the
person is in fact making a bad decision—perhaps they are doing something they don’t
understand (an irrational choice) or don’t want to do (an inauthentic choice).
The Exercises Capacity hypothesis aligns with contemporary philosophical views of valid
consent, according to which a decision to consent must in fact be rational (Savulescu &
Momeyer, 1995), well informed, voluntary, or reflective of appropriate values in order to be
considered relevantly autonomous and valid (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013; Pugh 2020).
While philosophical and bioethical views of valid consent do not require that consenters make
the objectively best choice, many philosophical and bioethical accounts state that the
autonomous quality of the agent’s decision-making—specifically, the extent to which it is
rational or based on the consenter’s own preferences and values—plays some kind of necessary
role in determining whether consent is valid. More broadly, legal and institutional requirements
of consent are thought to help protect this philosophical ideal of autonomous decision-making,
in which individuals are free to promote their own well-being as defined by their own, personal
values (see Berg et al., 2001, Chapter 2).
By contrast, the Mere Capacity Hypothesis contends that it matters little whether agents in
fact decide autonomously; it matters only whether they have the capacity to do so. Thus, this
hypothesis has the somewhat surprising implication that being incapacitated undermines
consent, but not because of how this state in fact affects the agent’s decision-making process;
if a sober person made the exact same choice in an equally irrational or impulsive way, their
decision would constitute valid consent. If the Mere Capacity Hypothesis is right, then,
autonomy matters for valid consent even when the decision to consent is not an expression of
the agent’s autonomy; instead, it matters only that it was the decision of an autonomous agent.
1.3. The present research
The present studies investigate the relationship between attributions of valid consent
and the autonomy of the consenter. Studies 1 and 2 investigate whether the folk concept of
valid consent requires that the consenter possesses autonomous capacities, and whether it
additionally requires that the consenter’s choice be the product of autonomous decisionmaking. Study 3 investigates the effect of autonomous decision-making capacities on
hypothesized downstream consequences of consent, including moral judgments and the
allocation of rights to third parties.
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Open science. Reports of all measures, manipulations, and exclusions, as well as all data,
analysis code, and experimental materials are available for download at https://osf.io/z5cdh.
2. Study 1
Study 1 was designed to assess whether the mere possession of autonomous decisionmaking capacities—or the exercise of those capacities—matters for the folk concept of valid
concept.
2.1. Methods
Sample
size,
predictions
and
analyses
were
pre-registered
(https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=zv7mm4), and our analyses adhere closely to our
preregistered plans.
2.1.1

Participants

In line with our pre-registration, we recruited 450 participants on Amazon Mechanical
Turk. After excluding participants who answered at least one of the binary-choice attention
checks incorrectly, we were left with a sample of 364 participants (52.6% male, 47.4% female;
median age 36 years).1
2.1.2

Design

Participants were randomly assigned to read one of nine vignettes in a 3 (autonomy:
Exercises Capacity; Mere Capacity; Lacks Capacity) by 3 (domain: medical consent; sexual
consent; consent to police entry) between-subjects design.
2.1.3

Procedure and materials

The vignettes begin by explaining that an agent is facing a decision about whether to
consent to something: an elective surgery (medical consent condition), sex after a date (sexual
consent condition), or consenting to police entering and searching the person’s home (police
entry condition). The vignettes were adapted from materials used by Sommers, 2020. The full
materials are available in Appendix B; here we illustrate the three conditions using the vignette
from the medical domain (see Table 1). In the Exercises Capacity condition, the agent both
possesses and exercises the capacity to make autonomous decisions and says “yes” based on
their personal values and thinking things through rationally; in the Mere Capacity condition,
the agent possesses the capacity to do this but does not exercise it, and fails to think things
through rationally or base their decision on their personal values; and in the Lacks Capacity
condition, the agent does not possess these autonomous decision-making capacities at all.

Medical Consent Vignette
Exercises Capacity
Mere Capacity
Lacks Capacity
Marvin has been in physical therapy for ankle pain. One day his doctor asks him whether
he wishes to undergo elective surgery to repair the tendon. The doctor explains that surgery
1

Consistent with our pre-registration, we present all results with and without exclusions in Appendix A, where
we also note where these exclusions made a substantial difference to results. We follow this procedure for all
studies.

6
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/210
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3904797

6

Demaree-Cotton and Sommers:

would carry some risks, as all surgeries do, but if all goes well it could potentially
completely cure his ankle pain.
Marvin is an intelligent, Marvin is an intelligent, Marvin is not able and
able adult. He is perfectly able adult. He is perfectly intelligent
like
most
capable of weighing up pros capable of weighing up pros adults. He is completely
and cons; thinking through and cons; thinking through incapable of weighing up
the choice he faces; and the choice he faces; and pros and cons; thinking
making decisions based on making decisions based on through the choice he faces;
what is best for him, which what is best for him, which and making decisions based
options align with his options align with his on what is best for him,
personal values, and what personal values, and what which options align with his
he really wants.
he really wants.
personal values, and what
he really wants.
And he does so in this But he doesn’t do so in this So he doesn’t do so in this
instance. After thinking instance. Without thinking instance. Without thinking
things
through
very things through even a little things through even a little
carefully—and with careful bit—and with absolutely bit—and with absolutely no
regard for the pros and cons, no regard for the pros and regard for the pros and
and whether it aligns with cons, or whether it aligns cons, or whether it aligns
his personal values and with his personal values and with his personal values and
what he really wants— what he really wants— what he really wants—
Marvin says ‘yes’ to the Marvin says ‘yes’ to the Marvin says ‘yes’ to the
surgery.
surgery.
surgery.
Table 1. Study 1 vignette used in the medical consent condition, varied by autonomy
condition. Boldface type is used here for emphasis; it was not used in the stimuli presented
to participants.
After reading the vignette, participants rated their agreement with a series of statements,
presented in a random order, on seven-point Likert scales that ranged from strongly disagree
to strongly agree.
Because “valid consent” is a technical term that may not reflect ordinary reasoning, we used
three measures to assess judgments of valid consent, as follows (adapted according to vignette):
Consent 1: The doctor had Marvin’s permission to proceed with the surgery.
Consent 2: If the doctor proceeds with the surgery now, he’ll be acting without Marvin’s
consent.2 (reverse-scored)
Consent 3: Marvin’s ‘yes’ didn’t count as consent. (reverse-scored)
According to the Mere Capacity Hypothesis, lacking capacity will be perceived as
undermining valid consent, whereas failing to exercise capacity will not. Thus, the Lacks
Capacity agent will be rated as lower in consent than the Exercises Capacity agent, while the
Mere Capacity agent will not. By contrast, according to the Exercises Capacity Hypothesis,
failing to exercise capacity will be perceived as undermining consent. Thus, both the Mere

2

A typo was discovered in the measure for Consent 2 for participants in the Police Entry condition. Although the
character in the vignette is called “Johnny”, this measure read, “If the police officers enter and search Frank’s
home now, they will be acting without Johnny’s consent”. However, this error did not appear to affect the results,
which did not change substantially when Consent 2 was included in the overall consent composite.
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Capacity and the Lacks Capacity agent will be rated as lower in consent than the Exercises
Capacity agent.
We also measured participants’ judgments of the extent to which the agent was making the
right choice by saying “yes”:
Right Choice: Having surgery was probably the right choice for Marvin.
To ensure that our manipulations had the intended effect, we included four measures to
check whether participants thought the agent had the general capacity to make decisions
rationally and authentically (phrased as “the ability to be true to himself when making
decisions”), as well as whether they thought the agent had done so in this particular instance
(e.g. “Marvin made this particular decision rationally”; “When Marvin said ‘yes’ to having
surgery, he was not being true to himself”).
Following these manipulation checks, participants answered four binary-choice attention
checks (e.g., “At the time the doctor suggested surgery, Marvin was capable/incapable of
thinking through his choices and deciding based on the pros and cons”).” We pre-registered
that we would exclude participants who failed one or more of these attention checks. Finally,
participants completed an exploratory measure that asked them to describe the reasoning
behind their consent judgments, and a demographic survey in which they reported, in fixed
order, their political views, bilingual status, age, gender, education, income, and race.
2.2. Results
2.2.1

Manipulation checks

As intended, the Autonomy manipulation was perceived as affecting capacities for rational
and authentic decision-making (see Appendix A for full details). The agents in both the
Exercises Capacity and Mere Capacity conditions were judged to possess capacities for rational
and authentic decision-making, but the agent in Lacks Capacity was not. When it came to
judgments of whether the agent made this particular decision rationally and authentically, by
contrast, the agent in Mere Capacity garnered significantly lower ratings than did the agent in
Exercises Capacity.
2.2.2

Judgments of Valid Consent and Right Choice

The three consent items created a reliable scale (α = .74); thus, they were averaged together
to create a composite measure of consent. We analyzed this composite using the lme4 and
lmerTest packages in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker et al. 2014; Kuznetsova,
Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017). Data were fit to a linear mixed model with autonomy
condition included as a fixed factor and domain included as a random factor (random intercepts
only) in all models. Significance of fixed effects was assessed via t-tests using Satterthwaite’s
method.
As predicted, participants’ judgments conformed to the Mere Capacity hypothesis: lacking
capacity had a large undermining effect on judgments of valid consent, whereas mere failure
to exercise capacity did not. Compared to the Exercises Capacity baseline (M = 5.98, SD =
1.08), the Lacks Capacity condition yielded significantly lower agreement that the agent gave
valid consent (M = 4.78, SD = 1.41), b = -1.21, SE = 0.14, t = -8.81, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.48,
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-0.94]. The Mere Capacity condition, by contrast, failed to yield lower agreement that the agent
gave valid consent. In fact, participants gave higher ratings of valid consent in the Mere
Capacity condition (M = 6.38, SD = 0.84) than in the Exercises Capacity condition, b = 0.36,
SE = 0.15, t = 2.35, p = .019, CI [0.06, 0.65]. Judgments of consent were significantly higher
in the Mere Capacity condition than in the Lacks Capacity condition, b = -1.56, SE = 0.16, t =
-10.05, p < .001 95% CI [-1.87, 1.26]. See Figure 1. An exploratory analysis treating domain
as a fixed effect in a two-way ANOVA revealed no interaction between domain and autonomy
condition, F(4, 355) = 0.83, p = .51.3 There was, however, a main effect of domain, F(2, 355)
= 9.99, p < .001: participants gave overall lower ratings of consent in the police entry vignette.

Judgments of Consent and Right Choice
Exercises
Capacity

Mere
Capacity

Lacks
Capacity

7
6

Agreement

5
4
3
2
1

Consent Composite

Right Choice

Figure 1. Respondents (n = 364) judged an agent who possesses autonomous decision-making
capacities but fails to exercise them to give no less valid consent than an agent who both
possesses and exercises such capacities. An agent who lacks autonomous decision-making
capacities was viewed as giving less valid consent. This pattern was observed despite
participants believing that saying ‘yes’ was more likely to be the right choice for the fully
autonomous agent compared to the Mere Capacity agent, who in turn was more likely to have
made the right choice compared to the Lacks Capacity agent. Error bars represent bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals.

Judgments of Right Choice yielded a different pattern to judgments of valid consent (Fig.
1). We predicted that assessments of whether having surgery (or having sex, allowing the police
to enter) was the right choice for the agent would be affected by both the possession and the
exercise of autonomous capacities. As predicted, participants exhibited lower agreement that
the Mere Capacity agent (M = 4.19, SD = 1.50) made the right choice compared to the Exercises
3

In line with this, exploratory pairwise comparisons indicated that within each domain, the Lacks Capacity
condition led to significantly lower ratings of valid consent.
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Capacity agent (M = 5.05, SD = 1.57), b = -1.01, SE = 0.19, t = -5.43, p < .001, CI [-1.38, 0.65]. Judgments were even lower among the Lacks Capacity condition (M = 3.47, SD = 1.73)
compared to the Mere Capacity condition, b = -0.58, SE = 0.19, t = -3.05, p = .002, CI [-0.96,
-0.21].4

Consent Judgments by Domain
Exercises
Capacity

Mere
Capacity

Lacks
Capacity

7

Consent Judgments

6
5
4
3
2
1

Medical Domain

Sexual Domain

Police Entry

Figure 2. Across three domains, participants (n = 364) judged an agent who possesses
autonomous decision-making capacities but fails to exercise them as validly consenting just as
much as an agent who both possesses and exercises such capacities, while an agent who lacks
autonomous decision-making capacity was viewed as giving less valid consent. Error bars
represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.

2.3. Discussion
The results of Study 1 suggest that autonomy plays an important role in the folk concept of
valid consent: when agents lack the capacity to make autonomous decisions, as in the Lacks
Capacity condition, judgments of the validity of consent are reduced. Notably, this relationship
between autonomy and consent was consistent across different domains, including medical
consent, sexual consent, and consent to police entering the home, suggesting that a domaingeneral concept of valid consent may be operative in reasoning about consent across these very

4

An ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between condition and domain on judgments of whether the
agent made the right choice, F(4, 355) = 1.76, p = .14. There was a main effect of scenario, F(2, 355) = 62.49, p
< .001: participants more strongly believed that the agent in the medical scenario (M = 5.36, SD = 1.12, n = 128)
made the right choice as compared to the agents in the policing (M = 3.56, SD = 2.03, n = 112) or the sexual
consent (M = 3.82, SD = 1.44, n = 124) scenarios.
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different contexts.5 Further, the results suggest people use a concept of valid consent that goes
beyond the mere question of whether the agent said “yes” or “no”, since all our conditions
involved agents saying “yes”.
However, folk judgments were not consistent with the Exercises Capacity view of valid
consent, according to which the making of a decision in an autonomous manner is crucial for
determining the validity of consent. Participants did not rate the consent of the Mere Capacity
agent as any less valid compared to the Exercises Capacity agent, even though the Mere
Capacity agent was described as saying “yes” without any regard whatsoever for the pros or
cons or their own values.
This finding was observed despite the fact that participants recognized that failing to
exercise autonomous decision-making has a strong impact on quality of choice, as indicated
by our manipulation checks and our “Right Choice” measure: participants tended to disagree
that the Mere Capacity agents were deciding rationally, and tended to disagree or neither agree
nor disagree that they were being true to themselves and making the right choice. By contrast,
participants overwhelmingly agreed that the Exercises Capacity agents were deciding
rationally and being true to themselves, and tended to agree that they were making the right
choice. Nevertheless, this assessment did not lead participants to judge that their consent was
more valid. It therefore seems that while participants appear to view autonomous decisionmaking as valuable, they do not view it as required for valid consent.
Thus, participants’ judgments accorded with the Mere Capacity view of valid consent,
according to which it is only required that the consenter possesses capacities for autonomous
decision-making, even if they do not exercise them.
Surprisingly, we found that judgments of the validity of consent were slightly higher for
the Mere Capacity agent. Because the vignette in this condition emphasized that the agent in
question failed to make his decision in a rational manner that was sensitive to his own values,
even though they had the capacity to do so, participants may have felt that the vignette was
implicitly suggesting that failing to make the decision autonomously can undermine consent.
We suspect that participants may then have given even stronger ratings of valid consent (close
to ceiling) to express disagreement with this implicit suggestion.
3. Study 2
Study 2 sought to determine the robustness of the finding that whether an agent
possesses autonomous decision-making capacities, but not whether the agent makes a decision
in an autonomous manner, is crucial for judgments of valid consent, while overcoming some
limitations of Study 1.

5

Exploratory analyses indicated that the Police Entry vignette yielded lower ratings of valid consent overall
compared to the Sexual and Medical consent vignettes. A number of features of the vignette may have contributed
to this. Firstly, the consent in the Police Entry vignette may have been perceived to be less free due to stronger
power dynamics: unlike in the other vignettes, the people requesting consent in Police Entry were two police
officers, and thus may have been perceived to be in a greater position of power and authority compared to the
single doctor or the single sexual partner as described in the other vignettes. Second, participants may have been
motivated to give lower ratings of consent because they disapprove of the kind of police search described by the
vignette, irrespective of the citizen’s consent.
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First, Study 2 investigates whether the finding is observed even if participants are given
descriptions of more concrete features of irrational or inauthentic decision-making. In Study 1,
participants were presented with a description of a decision-making process at a high level of
abstraction. Furthermore, the vignettes offered no information about why the Mere Capacity
agent failed to make the decision autonomously. It remains possible, then, that participants
would take the failures to engage in autonomous decision-making to reduce the validity of
consent if offered more concrete descriptions of irrationality or inauthenticity. If so, this would
suggest that the folk concept coheres with the Exercises Capacity view of valid consent after
all. Consequently, Study 2 was designed to test whether our findings would extend to more
concrete, realistic, and varied failures of autonomy. We did this by using vignettes involving a
variety of ways in which an agent might fail to make their decision autonomously: by acting
impulsively, giving in to peer pressure, basing a decision on irrational beliefs, or making an
uninformed choice despite the availability of crucial information.
Second, in Study 1 participants were given no explicit information about whether
saying “yes” was the right outcome for the agent. Because of this, even if the Mere Capacity
agent did not make the decision in a rational or authenticity-preserving way, the scenario left
open the possibility that the activity in question was in fact the option that best cohered with
their reasons and values. For instance, participants might judge that having corrective surgery
is likely to cohere with the values of a competent agent seeing the doctor about their ankle pain.
Study 2 sought to use a more stringent test of whether the folk concept of valid consent merely
requires autonomous decision-making capacities or whether it additionally requires the making
of autonomous decisions by using vignettes that specify that the agent in the Mere Capacity
and Lacks Capacity conditions makes the wrong decision relative to their reasons and values,
while the Exercises Capacity agent makes the right decision.
Finally, we also included an additional pair of manipulation checks to ensure that our
autonomy conditions mirrored folk judgments about autonomy—namely the ability to shape
one’s life freely according to one’s values. For instance, we asked participants to rate their
agreement with “The way Marvin made this particular decision expressed an ability to shape
his life freely according to his own values and what is right for him.” This allowed us to rule
out the possibility that participants think the Mere Capacity agent is deciding in a way that is
equally as autonomous as the Exercises Capacity agent (e.g., because participants surmise that
the Mere Capacity agent is making an autonomous decision not to exercise his capabilities,
thus expressing a kind of meta-autonomous desire to make the choice in a nonautonomous
way).
3.1. Methods
Sample size, predictions and analyses were pre-registered
(https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=gs43rp).
3.1.1. Participants
In line with our pre-registration, we recruited 600 participants on Amazon Mechanical
Turk. After excluding participants who failed at least one of the attention checks, we were left
with a sample of 384 participants (49.6% male, 49.6% female, 0.8% other gender; median age
37 years).
3.1.2. Design
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Participants were randomly allocated to one of twelve conditions in a 3 (Autonomy:
Exercises Capacity; Mere Capacity; Lacks Capacity) by 4 (Failure Type: Impulse; Peer
Pressure; Uninformed; Irrational Superstition) between-subjects design.
3.1.3. Procedure and materials
Each participant was presented with a vignette in which an agent, Marvin, is facing a
choice about whether to undergo an elective surgery and ends up saying “yes.” Before saying
“yes,” he faces the possibility of having his decision non-autonomously determined by impulse,
peer pressure, lack of information, or irrational superstition (depending on Failure Type).
Autonomy conditions determined whether he possessed the capacity to make the decision
according to his values and reasons, and whether or not he in fact did so.
As in Study 1, the Exercises Capacity agent is described as having the capacity to make
the decision in an autonomous, rational manner (e.g., able to make decisions for himself and
override impulses when they are inappropriate), as in fact doing so (e.g., resisting an initial,
impulsive reaction to say “no”, and instead thinking things through in a rational and authentic
way), and as a result saying “yes.” This is described as the right choice for him.
The Mere Capacity agent is described as having these very same capacities, but as not
exercising them (e.g., giving in to an initial impulsive reaction to say “yes” without thinking
things through in a rational or authentic way) and as a result saying “yes” even though that is
not the right choice for him. The Lacks Capacity agent lacks these capacities altogether (e.g.,
he is not able to make decisions for himself and resist inappropriate impulses) and thus says
“yes” even though it is not the right choice for him. See Table 2 for an illustration of the
vignettes used in the Impulse condition; full text for all conditions is available in Appendix B.

Intro paragraph (all conditions):
Marvin has been in physical therapy for ankle pain. One day his doctor asks him whether he
wishes to undergo elective surgery to repair the tendon. The doctor explains that the surgery
carries some risks, as all surgeries do, but if all goes well it could potentially completely cure
his ankle pain.
Exercises Capacity:
Mere Capacity:
Lacks Capacity:
Marvin feels an initial Marvin feels an initial Marvin feels an initial
impulse to simply say ‘no’ to impulse to simply say ‘yes’ impulse to simply say ‘yes’
surgery.
surgery.
surgery.
Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult, fully capable of
making decisions for himself
and controlling impulses
when they are inappropriate.

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult, fully capable of
making decisions for himself
and controlling impulses
when they are inappropriate.

Marvin is not able and
intelligent like most adults
who are fully capable of
making
decisions
for
themselves: he is completely
incapable of controlling
impulses, even when they are
inappropriate.
And he does so in this But he does not do so in this So he does not do so in this
instance. Although he feels instance. Acting on an instance. Acting on an
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an initial impulse to avoid
surgery, he thinks things
through carefully, and makes
his decision with careful
regard for the pros and cons,
and whether surgery aligns
with his personal values and
what he really wants.
Because of this, Marvin says
‘yes’ to the surgery.

initial impulse to have the
surgery, he doesn’t think
things through even a little
bit, and pays absolutely no
attention to the pros and
cons, or whether surgery
aligns with his personal
values and what he really
wants. He simply says ‘yes’
to the surgery on an impulse.

initial impulse to have the
surgery, he doesn’t think
things through even a little
bit, and pays absolutely no
attention to the pros and
cons, or whether surgery
aligns with his personal
values and what he really
wants. He simply says ‘yes’
to the surgery on an impulse.

If he had not resisted his If he had resisted his initial If he had resisted his initial
initial impulse and made a impulse and made a decision impulse and made a decision
decision based on thinking based on thinking things based on thinking things
things through properly, through properly, Marvin through properly, Marvin
Marvin would have said ‘no’, would have said ‘no’, as it is would have said ‘no’, as it is
despite surgery being the not the right choice for him. not the right choice for him.
right choice for him.
Table 2. Vignette used in the Impulse Failure Type condition, with variations according to
Autonomy condition. Boldface type is used here for emphasis; it was not used in the stimuli
presented to participants.

As in Study 1, participants rated their agreement with a number of statements presented
in a random order on a seven-point Likert scale. We used the same three measures to assess
judgments of valid consent (e.g., “Marvin’s ‘yes’ didn’t count as consent”).
In addition to the manipulation check measures from Study 1, we added two
manipulation check questions eliciting judgments of autonomy:
Capacity for autonomy: Marvin has the ability to shape his own life freely according
to his own values and what is right for him.
Decided autonomously: The way Marvin made this particular decision expressed an
ability to shape his life freely according to his own values and what is right for him.
Following the Likert-scale measures, we again included attention checks. Participants
were asked three binary-choice questions, presented in random order, concerning (1) the
agent’s capacities; (2) the way they made the decision, and (3) whether they made the right
choice. (In other words, in Study 2 “right choice” was included as a manipulation check rather
than as a main dependent measure.) For instance, the attention checks in the Impulse condition
were: “Marvin is/is not able to resist and overcome impulses.”; “Marvin made this particular
decision by thinking it through properly/on an impulse.”; “Having surgery was/was not the
right choice for Marvin.”
Finally, participants completed an exploratory question explaining their answer and a
demographic survey as in Study 1.
3.2. Results
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3.2.1. Manipulation checks and autonomy judgments
Again, participants’ conceptual judgments exhibited the predicted patterns (see
Appendix A for full details). As intended, both the Exercises Capacity and Mere Capacity agent
were judged to possess capacities for rational, authentic, and autonomous decision-making, but
the Lacks Capacity agent was not. Also as intended, the agent in Mere Capacity was rated
significantly lower on having made this particular decision rationally, authentically and
autonomously compared to the Exercises Capacity agent.
3.2.2. Judgments of Valid Consent
Again, we created a composite measure of judgments of valid consent (α =.73). We fit
a linear mixed model with autonomy condition included as a fixed factor and failure type
included as a random factor. The model was a singular fit because of an estimate of zero
variance for the intercept, suggesting that the model did not warrant a random effect of failure
type (e.g., Henne et al., 2019). Hence, we simplified the model, using a linear model with no
random effects.
In line with our hypotheses, participants rated consent as higher in the Exercises
Capacity condition (M = 6.15, SD = 1.23) than in the Lacks Capacity condition (M = 5.21, SD
= 1.28), b = -0.94, SE = 0.15, t = -6.42, p < .001, CI [-1.22, -0.65], but no higher than in the
Mere Capacity condition (M = 5.93, SD = 1.17), b = -0.22, SE = 0.16, t = -1.38, p = .17, CI [0.54, 0.09]. Judgments of consent differed significantly between the Mere Capacity condition
and the Lacks Capacity condition, b = -0.71, SE = .17, t = -4.30, p < .001 CI [-1.04, -0.39]. See
Figure 3. From a Bayesian perspective, these results provided support for the absence of an
effect of Exercising Capacity vs. Mere Capacity on consent judgments, though the evidence
for this null result is “weak” or “anecdotal,” falling short of “positive” or “substantial” (BF10
= 0.36).6
In line with our pre-registration, we confirmed, via a two-way ANOVA in which failure
type was treated as a fixed effect, that the interaction between autonomy condition and failure
type was not significant, F(6, 372) = .58, p = .75.7 Despite this, we conducted exploratory post
hoc pairwise comparisons within the Uninformed failure type, using the Holm correction to
adjust p, to explore the possibility that this vignette yielded a different effect of condition (see
Figure 3). These post hoc tests revealed that consent judgments did not differ significantly
between Exercises Capacity and Mere Capacity conditions in the Uninformed vignette (p =
.084), but they did differ between the Exercises Capacity and Lacks capacity conditions (p <
.001). Consent judgments did not differ between the Mere Capacity and Lacks Capacity
conditions (p = .25).

6

This Bayesian t-test was not pre-registered, but was helpfully suggested by a reviewer.
This finding further justified collapsing across Failure Type. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of autonomy
condition, F(2, 372) = 21.36, p < .001. There was no main effect of Failure Type, F(3, 372) = .54, p = .66.

7
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Consent Judgments by Failure Type
Exercises
Capacity

Mere
Capacity

Lacks
Capacity

7

Consent Judgments

6
5
4
3
2
1

Impulse

Uninformed

Peer Pressure

Superstition

Figure 3. Results from Study 2 for mean agreement that the agent gave valid consent. Compared to
an agent who possessed and exercised autonomous decision-making capacities, participants (n =
381) were not less likely to judge that an agent gave valid consent when they possessed autonomous
decision-making capacities but failed to exercise them in some way (through impulse, being
uninformed, peer pressure, or irrational superstition). Participants were significantly less inclined to
agree that an agent who lacked an autonomous decision-making capacity gave valid consent. Error
bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.

3.3. Discussion
Study 2 replicated and extended our main findings from Study 1. Once again, judgments
of valid consent were related to the possession of autonomous capacities, but not to the exercise
of those capacities. As in Study 1, it didn’t matter whether the consenter actually made the
decision for himself in an autonomous way: participants regarded the consent of an agent with
autonomous decision-making capacities to be equally valid even if he did not make this
particular decision autonomously. This was so even though we explicitly specified that the
Mere Capacity agent would have said “no” had he made the decision properly, because it
wasn’t the right choice for him, whereas the Exercises Capacity agent would have said “yes.”
We found this pattern for a number of different “Failure Types” that invoked particular,
concrete capacities involved in autonomous decision-making. For instance, judgments of
consent were reduced when the agent lacked the general ability to control impulses, to resist
peer pressure, to get relevant information, or to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable ways
of making decisions. Judgments of the validity of the agent’s consent were not lower when the
agent retained those capacities but said “yes” on impulse, because of peer pressure to say “yes,”
because of a failure to inform themselves, or because of an irrational and unreasonable
superstition.
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These findings thus provide stronger evidence that whether an agent makes an autonomous
decision is not important for judgments that consent was valid, even though having the capacity
to make an autonomous decision does matter.
While this main finding was consistent across different Failure Types, the Uninformed
category appeared to creep towards subtly different results. While post hoc analyses indicated
that only the Lacks Capacity condition yielded significantly lower judgments of valid consent
compared to Exercises capacity, in line with our main findings, the Uninformed Mere Capacity
agent appeared closer to the Lacks Capacity agent than the Exercises Capacity agent.
One possible explanation for the appearance of a different trend for the Uninformed
category that the vignette described a case of consent to a medical procedure. Unlike other
consent contexts, medicine is associated with explicit institutional and cultural norms of the
importance of so-called “informed consent.” Awareness of this norm could have reduced
ratings in the Mere Capacity condition, either because participants agreed with this domainspecific norm, or because awareness of this norm affected participants’ judgments of consent.
Another possibility, of course, is that the apparent deviation from the main pattern in this
condition is simply noise due to random error. Future research could confirm whether
attempting to inform oneself is important for judgments of valid consent, preferably using a
larger array of vignettes including non-medical contexts.
4. Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 establish that judgments of valid consent vary according to autonomy. But
in what respect does it matter whether a “yes” is judged to be valid or invalid? Are these
judgments superficial, merely reflecting how words like “consent” are used, without playing
an important role in moral reasoning? We designed Study 3 to investigate whether participants
intuitively embrace a normative concept of valid consent akin to that employed in philosophical
and legal spheres by examining whether their judgments of valid consent carry important
downstream consequences for moral reasoning.
How might consent affect moral reasoning? One obvious answer is that it’s more
morally wrong to perform an action (e.g., take something that belongs to someone else) if it
was not validly consented to. For example, recent work by Rodríguez-Arias and colleagues
(2020) on the topic of physician-assisted suicide suggests that consent has important
implications for moral judgments. Specifically, their studies showed that consent is responsible
for the morally motivated causal distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’: if a patient
consents to ending their life, then the cause of death is judged to be the patient’s illness, but if
the patient does not consent, the doctor is seen as ‘killing’ the patient. It appears that here the
giving of consent affects whether the doctor’s action is construed as permissible assistance or
as something morally wrong.
However, according to the philosophical and legal concept, the effect of valid
autonomous consent should be even more far-reaching than its effect on judgments of the moral
permissibility of performing the consented-to act: consent should additionally determine
various parties’ rights and obligations.
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As described earlier, the presence or absence of valid consent is thought to be crucial
even if the consented-to act is morally wrong. Adulterous sex might be morally wrong
regardless of consent, for instance, but the presence or absence of consent is thought to
determine both the severity and criminality of the wrong. Crucially, the presence or absence of
consent carries consequences for rights and obligations, such as the right or duty of third parties
to forcibly intervene in the case of rape but not adultery; of police to arrest the rapist; the right
of the sexual partner to seek redress and justice in the case of rape; and so on. Consent similarly
functions to alter rights and obligations in other domains: consent is thought to determine
whether or not a signer is bound by the terms of a contract. in the case of ownership, consent
determines if the taking of an item constitutes a sale, and thus the successful transfer of
ownership rights to a new owner (rather than, e.g., a theft).
In Study 3, we chose to study whether the effect of autonomy on judgments of valid
consent carries downstream consequences for judgments of ownership transfer. As discussed
in the introduction, prior research suggests that the presence or absence of consent plays a role
in the ascription of ownership rights. Prior research suggests that adults and children reason
about violations of ownership rights in a very similar way to how they reason about violations
of bodily rights (Van de Vondervoort & Friedman, 2015), which supports our hypothesis that
the same concept of valid consent should extend to this domain. Studying ownership also
allowed us to extend the findings from Study 1 and Study 2 to a new context.
Study 3 employed a vignette in which the owner of an item gives consent to a second
party (the seller) to sell that item; the item is then bought by an innocent third party (the buyer).
Introducing a blameless third party provided a clean way to assess the potential downstream
consequences of the validity of consent. For instance, if an owner consents to selling something
only because they haven’t thought it through properly, and the seller knows this, participants
might reasonably judge that the seller is doing something morally wrong, since they are
knowingly doing something that’s bad for the consenter/original owner. Nevertheless, based
on Studies 1 and 2, we predicted that participants would judge such a transaction to be
consensual. Thus, assessing the allocation of rights to an innocent third party (the buyer)
allowed us to differentiate the effect of autonomous consent on the morality of the consentedto action, on the one hand, and its impact on rights, on the other.
We predicted that whether participants judge that ownership rights have transferred to
the buyer of an item would depend on whether they judged that the original owner gave valid
consent to the sale, which itself would depend on the possession of autonomous decisionmaking capacities. Thus, we hypothesized that if the consenter (the original owner) has
autonomous decision-making capacities, then consent will be judged to be valid, and the buyer
will be judged to have been conferred ownership rights. By contrast, if the consenter lacks
autonomous decision-making capacities, then participants will judge consent to have been
invalid; in turn, we expect them to judge that the consenter retains ownership rights and that
the buyer has failed to gain ownership rights. Importantly, we expected that whether the
consenter exercises autonomous decision-making capacities would not have an impact on valid
consent or the transfer of ownership rights.
4.1.Methods
Sample size, predictions and analyses were pre-registered
(https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=2fv78s).
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4.1.1. Participants
In line with our pre-registration, we set out to recruit 300 participants on Amazon
Mechanical Turk; 303 were recruited due to random M-Turk software error. After excluding
participants who failed at least one of the attention checks (N=143) and additional participants
who wrote gibberish (N=7), we were left with a sample of 153 participants (59.5% male, 40.5%
female; median age 34 years). Responses classified as gibberish included nonsense, responses
that were identical to those of other participants, copy-and-pasted material from the
experiment, and irrelevant copy-and-pasted material from the internet.
4.1.2. Design
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three Autonomy conditions in a fully
between-subjects design: Exercises Capacity; Mere Capacity; Lacks Capacity.
4.1.3. Procedure and materials
All participants were presented with a vignette in which an agent, Jessica, is in hospital
recovering from a procedure. The full text is available in Appendix B. Sam comes to visit
Jessica and asks for consent to sell her diamond bracelet—a bracelet which is very precious to
her but which he thinks could make them a lot of money.
In all conditions, Jessica says “yes”, but her autonomy differs according to condition.
In the Exercises Capacity and Mere Capacity conditions, Jessica is not on heavy medication.
She is described as being “perfectly capable of weighing up pros and cons, thinking through
choices she faces, and making decisions based on what is best for her, which options align with
her personal values, and what she really wants,” and although she is on medication, “it's only
ibuprofen and some antibiotics. In fact, she feels calm and lucid, and nothing is interfering in
any way with her ability to think or make decisions.”
In the Exercises Capacity condition, she goes on to use these capacities to make her
decision to consent in an autonomous way: “using her ability to make decisions according to
her own values and what is best for her, Jessica says ‘yes’ after thinking things through very
carefully, with careful regard for the pros and cons and whether it’s what she really wants.” By
contrast, in the Mere Capacity condition, “despite her ability to make decisions according to
her own values and what is best for her, Jessica just says ‘yes’ to the sale without thinking
things through even a little bit, and with absolutely no regard for the pros and cons or whether
it’s what she really wants.”
Finally, in the Lacks Capacity condition, Jessica is on heavy medication that
undermines her decision-making capacities: “the medication she is on is incredibly powerful
and is severely interfering with her ability to think and make decisions. Indeed, in her current
state she is completely incapable of weighing up pros and cons, thinking through choices she
faces, or making decisions based on what is best for her, which options align with her personal
values, or what she really wants.” Consequently, she does not make her decision in her
autonomous way: “so Jessica says ‘yes’ to the sale without thinking things through even a little
bit, and with absolutely no regard for the pros and cons, or whether it’s what she really wants.”
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For all participants, Sam is described as being only motivated by making money, and
not caring about which decision will make Jessica happy; in fact, he proceeds even though he
suspects that Jessica will regret her decision.
The vignette then goes on to describe the completion of the sale by Sam to a blameless
third party, Melanie, who sees the bracelet advertised as for sale online, pays for it, and receives
the bracelet in the mail two days later.
After reading the vignette, participants rated their agreement with a series of statements,
presented in a random order, on seven-point Likert scales. The vignette remained visible to
participants for their reference.
We measured judgments of valid consent, morality, and ownership rights using
agreement with a seven-point Likert scale. The three consent measures closely matched those
used in Studies 1 and 2 (e.g., “Jessica’s ‘yes’ didn’t count as consent”). Moral judgments of
the consented-to action were measured as follows:
Morality: Under these circumstances, it was morally wrong for Sam to proceed with
selling the bracelet. (reverse-scored)
We also used five new “ownership transfer” measures using a seven-point Likert scale
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” These were designed to assess judgments of the
rights and obligations of the buyer, Melanie.
Ownership Transfer 1: The bracelet does not truly belong to Melanie. (reversescored)
Ownership Transfer 2: Even if Melanie was told about the bracelet’s true history, it
would be morally acceptable for her to keep the bracelet if that’s what she wanted to
do.
Ownership Transfer 3: If Melanie was told about the bracelet’s true history, it
wouldn’t just be nice of her to give the bracelet back to Jessica: it would be her moral
duty to give it back. (reverse-scored)
Ownership Transfer 4: Melanie should be forced to return the bracelet. (reversescored)
Ownership Transfer 5: A good law would require the bracelet to be returned to
Jessica under these circumstances. (reverse-scored)
At the start of Ownership Transfer 2-5 measures, the question instructions clarified,
“Assume that Melanie could return the bracelet to Jessica and get her money back. Do you
agree with the following statement?” This was to make sure that participants’ answers reflected
judgments about whether ownership rights to the bracelet transferred to Melanie, and not
concerns about Melanie’s money. For this reason, Ownership Transfer measures 2-5 were
presented one after the other (in a random order) to aid participant comprehension, instead of
fully randomizing the order of all measures.
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In addition, we included one binary multiple-choice measure of ownership judgments as
follows:
Ownership, binary: Who is the rightful owner of the bracelet? [Options: Jessica/Melanie]
We additionally included manipulation checks as in Study 1.
Participants then completed two multiple-choice comprehension checks (“Which is
correct? Jessica’s medication interfered with her ability to think/Jessica’s medication DID
NOT interfere with her ability to think” and “Which is correct? Jessica said ‘yes’ WITH regard
for whether she really wanted to sell the bracelet / Jessica said ‘yes’ WITHOUT regard for
whether she really wanted to sell the bracelet”).
Finally, participants answered an exploratory open-ended question explaining their
reasoning, provided demographic information, and were debriefed.
4.2.Results
4.2.1

Manipulation checks

Our manipulations checks confirmed that the autonomy conditions successfully
manipulated participants’ judgments of Jessica’s autonomy in largely the desired way, with
minor exceptions.
Judgments of whether Jessica made the decision to consent rationally and authentically
showed the predicted pattern. While agreement that she made this decision rationally and
authentically was high in the Exercises Capacity condition, participants tended to disagree that
she made this decision rationally and authentically in the Mere Capacity and Lacks Capacity
conditions.
Judgments of whether Jessica possessed the capacity for autonomous decision-making
largely, but not entirely, conformed to predicted patterns. As expected, participants tended to
disagree that Jessica had the capacity to make decisions rationally (M = 2.11, SD = 1.60) and
authentically (M = 2.25, SD = 1.70) in the Lacks Capacity condition, while participants tended
to agree that she had the capacity in both the Exercises Capacity agent and the Mere Capacity
conditions. However, contrary to expectations, agreement with these measures was
significantly lower in the Mere Capacity condition compared to the Exercises Capacity
condition. Jessica was regarded as less capable of rationality in the Mere Capacity condition
(M = 4.96, SD = 1.73) compared to the Exercises Capacity condition (M = 5.88, SD = 1.12),
tWelch (83.00) = 3.08, p = .003. Additionally, she was regarded as having lower capacity for
authenticity in the Mere Capacity condition (M = 4.80, SD = 1.86) compared to the Exercises
Capacity condition (M = 5.74, SD = 1.18), tWelch (82.25) = 2.96, p = .004.
4.2.2. Judgments of Valid Consent
A composite measure of judgments of valid consent was created by averaging together
Consent 1, Consent 2 (reverse-scored), and Consent 3 (reverse-scored) (α =.89).
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of autonomy condition on judgments of
valid consent, F(2, 150) = 59.82, p < .001 (Fig. 4). Pairwise comparisons of estimated marginal
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means indicated that, as predicted, participants showed lower agreement that the agent in Lacks
Capacity gave valid consent (M = 2.75, SD = 1.53) relative to the Mere Capacity agent (M =
4.80, SD = 1.56), b = -2.05, SE = .28, t = -7.25, p < .001, CI [-2.61, -1.49].
Participants also showed slightly lower agreement that the agent in the Mere Capacity
condition gave valid consent compared to the Exercises Capacity condition (M = 5.84, SD =
1.27), b = -1.03, SE = 0.31, t = -3.36, p = .001, CI [-1.64, -0.43].
Nevertheless, mean ratings of valid consent in the Mere Capacity condition, t(48) = 3.60,
p < .001, d = 0.51, and the Exercises Capacity condition, t(42) = 9.46, p < .001, d = 1.44, were
both significantly above midpoint. By contrast, mean rating of valid consent in the Lacks
Capacity condition was significantly below midpoint (t(60) = -6.35, p < .001, d = -0.81).8
4.2.3. Judgments of Ownership Rights
The Likert ownership rights measures 1 and 3-5 were reverse-scored, so that for all
measures, higher score indicates greater agreement that ownership rights have been
successfully transferred (i.e. that the buyer, Melanie, is now the rightful owner of the bracelet,
and that the previous owner, Jessica, no longer has rights to it). The five measures of ownership
transfer showed very high scale reliability (α =.89), so a composite measure of ownership
transfer was created by averaging together all five variables.
The effect of condition on judgments of ownership transfer mirrored the pattern found for
judgments of valid consent, F(2, 150) = 35.60, p < .001 (Fig. 4). Pairwise comparisons of
estimated marginal means indicated that participants showed lower agreement that ownership
had been transferred in the Lacks Capacity condition (M = 3.18, SD = 1.40) relative to the Mere
Capacity agent (M = 4.71, SD = 1.58), b = -2.35, SE = .29, t = -8.14, p < .001, CI [-2.92, -1.78].
Participants also showed slightly lower agreement that ownership transferred in the Mere
Capacity condition compared to the Exercises Capacity condition (M = 5.53, SD = 1.36), b =
0.82, SE = .31, t = 2.69, p = .008, CI [-1.41, -0.22].

8

We thank a reviewer for suggesting these additional analyses. These comparisons to midpoint were not preregistered.
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Consent Judgments and Downstream Consequences
Exercises
Capacity

Mere
Capacity

Lacks
Capacity

7
6

Agreement

5
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1

Consent Composite

Ownership Transfer

Morality

Figure 4. Results for Study 3 showing the effect of Autonomy condition on mean agreement
that (i) there was valid consent, (ii) ownership rights transferred to the buyer, (iii) it was morally
permissible for Sam to sell the bracelet. Error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals.

The binary choice measure of ownership rights showed a similar pattern. In the
Exercises Capacity and Mere Capacity conditions, the majority of participants said that the
bracelet now belonged to Melanie (81.40% and 57.14% respectively), but in the Lacks
Capacity condition only a minority chose Melanie as the rightful owner (21.31%). Fisher’s
exact tests confirmed that in the Lacks Capacity condition, significantly fewer participants said
that the bracelet now belonged to Melanie compared to the Mere Capacity condition (Odds
ratio (OR) = 0.21, p < .001, CI [0.08, 0.50]), and compared to the Exercises Capacity condition
(OR = 0.06, p < .001, CI [0.02, 0.18]). The difference in ownership transfer judgments between
Mere Capacity and Exercises Capacity was also significant (OR = 0.31, p = .014, CI [0.10,
0.86]).
4.2.4. Judgments of Morality
Moral judgments were reverse-scored so that higher scores indicate higher agreement that
it was morally permissible to sell the bracelet, whereas lower scores indicate that it was not
morally permissible to sell the bracelet. We observed a significant effect of Autonomy
condition on moral judgments, F(2, 150) = 35.27, p < .001 (Fig. 4). Pairwise comparisons
indicated that, as predicted, participants tended to disagree more that this was morally
permissible in the Lacks Capacity condition, (M = 1.61, SD = .94) compared to the Mere
Capacity condition (M = 2.43, SD = 1.62), b = 0.82, SE = .29, t = -2.81, p = .005, CI [-1.40, 0.24]), where participants also exhibited strong disagreement that Sam’s conduct was morally
permissible. The agent in Exercises Capacity (M = 4.14, SD = 2.01) was viewed as acting more
permissibly as compared to the agent in Mere Capacity, b = -1.71, SE = 0.32, t = -5.38, p <
.001, CI [-2.34, -1.08]).
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4.2.5. Relationship Between Judgments of Consent and Ownership

Figure 5. Mediation model showing that the effect of autonomy condition on judgments of
ownership rights was fully mediated by the effect of autonomy condition on judgments of
valid consent. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown for each path. Asterisks
indicate statistically significant relationships, *** = p <.001. Dotted arrows indicate nonsignificant relationships.

Consistent with our pre-registered analyses, we used linear regression to assess whether
judgments of valid consent predicted transfer of ownership rights independently of the effect
of autonomy condition. The regression confirmed that they did, b = -0.80, SE = .10, t = -8.16,
p < .001, CI [-0.99, -0.61].
To further explore the relationship between judgments of valid consent and judgments of
ownership rights, we conducted an exploratory multicategorical mediation analysis using
Process v. 3.5, Model 4, with 10,000 bootstrapped samples (see Hayes, 2012; Hayes &
Preacher, 2014) and 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals for indirect effects. Autonomy
condition was entered as the independent variable and ownership rights judgments as the
dependent variable, with consent judgments as the mediator. Results suggested that judgments
of valid consent fully mediated the effect of Autonomy on judgments of ownership rights (see
Table 3 and Figure 5).

Autonomy condition
Exercises Capacity vs.
Mere Capacity

Indirect

b
.67

S.E.
.20

95% C.I.
.28, 1.06

p
-

Direct

.15

.24

-.32, .62

.538

Total

.82

.30

.22, 1.41

.008
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Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

Indirect

-1.32

.24

-1.83, -.88

-

Direct

-.21

.24

-.69, .27

.394

Total

-1.53

.28

-2.08, -.98

<.001

Table 3. b shows unstandardized indirect, direct, and total effects of Autonomy
condition on ownership rights via consent, with the Mere Capacity condition as the
baseline for comparison, with standard errors and 95% confidence intervals.

4.3. Discussion
Study 3 demonstrated that the impact of autonomy on judgments of valid consent has
important downstream consequences for the allocation of rights and obligations to others, here
under the category of “ownership rights.” When participants judged that consent to a sale was
not valid, they judged that the buyer had no right to the item, that it was her moral duty to give
it back, and that she should be forced to return it. By contrast, when participants judged that
consent to a sale was valid, they judged that the buyer was morally permitted to keep the item,
had no duty to return it, and should not be forced to return it.
Importantly, participants’ perceptions of ownership rights appeared to be independent of
their general moral judgments of the rightness or wrongness of the consented-to action. In this
case, whether or not consent was valid transformed the perceived rights and obligations of an
innocent third party (the buyer, Melanie), even though she was not involved in the acquisition
of consent, had no reason to suspect that the relevant consent was compromised, was not
culpable for any wrongdoing in the original consent transaction, and indeed did not have any
reason to suspect any wrongdoing.
Furthermore, moral assessment of the actions of the consent-obtainer (Sam, the seller)
came apart from judgments of the validity of the consent: moral judgments, but not judgments
of valid consent, were strongly affected by whether the consenter exercised her capacities to
make her decision in an autonomous manner. So, while Sam’s selling the bracelet was
considered somewhat morally permissible in the Exercises Capacity condition, it was
considered morally wrong in the Mere Capacity condition, where the consenter was rash and
failed to decide in a rational or authentic manner even though she had the mental capacity to
do so. By contrast, agreement that the consent was valid remained well above midpoint in both
the Exercises Capacity and Mere Capacity conditions.
As in Studies 1 and 2, judgments of whether consent was valid in the first place were
largely driven by the extent to which the agent possessed the capacity to make autonomous
decisions at the time of deciding. While participants showed slightly lower levels of agreement
that the Mere Capacity agent gave valid consent compared to the Exercises Capacity agent—
unlike in Studies 1 and 2—in both conditions, agreement remained above midpoint. By
contrast, ratings of valid consent dropped well below midpoint in the Lacks Capacity condition.
The finding the Mere Capacity agent’s failure to decide in an autonomous manner slightly
lowered perceptions of valid consent differed from predictions and from the results of Studies
1 and 2. Two possibilities could account for this inconsistency.
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On the one hand, it’s possible that the exercise of autonomous decision-making directly
promotes perceptions of the degree to which consent is valid some circumstances, even though
it is not normally regarded as necessary for moral transformation to take place (the decision of
the Mere Capacity agent was regarded as morally transformative). We speculate that this could
especially be the case when participants are less confident overall about whether the interaction
is consensual—perhaps because the person asking for consent appears to be exploiting or
coercing the consenter.
On the other hand, it’s likely that whether an agent exercises their autonomous decisionmaking capacities is itself used as a cue to make judgments about whether the agent possesses
autonomous capacities, which in turn drives judgments of the validity of their consent. For
example, whether a person behaves rationally affects the extent to which they are inferred to
have the capacity to behave rationally. Supporting this interpretation, we observed the same
pattern both for judgments of valid consent and for judgments of the agent’s capacities: unlike
in Studies 1 and 2, our manipulation checks showed that participants were less inclined to agree
that the Mere Capacity agent really did have the capacity for rational and authentic choice to
the same extent as they agreed that Exercises Capacity agent did. Although the vignette stated
that the Mere Capacity agent possessed these capacities, participants may have been more
uncertain about the true extent of these capacities, given that the agent was in a vulnerable
context (i.e., recovering from surgery in hospital) and there was no further explanation for why
they did not make a better decision. This was reflected in exploratory data we collected in
which we asked participants to justify their answers, as a number of participants who were in
the Mere Capacity condition but disagreed that the agent gave valid consent said they did not
truly believe that the agent’s capacity to choose was unimpaired. For example, one participant
wrote that “[r]egardless of what was said about Jessica being in her right mins [sic] it was
obvious that she wasn’t”. A number of others suggested that situational factors would have
undermined the agent’s capacity. For example, one participant wrote, “I think that Jessica was
in a stressful experience…I know that she is not on any mind altering medications, but surgery
itself is a lot to handle”; another wrote, “Jessica is in the hospital recovering from surgery.
Even if her medication isn't getting in the way of her thinking, her situation will certainly have
worn her down and exhausted her.”
5.

General Discussion

The present studies investigated the folk concept of valid consent and its relationship to
autonomy. Study 1 showed that when agents lack autonomous decision-making capacities,
participants are less likely to view their consent as valid, while simply failing to exercise these
capacities does not undermine perceived valid consent. Study 2 showed that failing to exercise
autonomous decision-making in various concrete ways (e.g., giving in to impulse) similarly
failed to reduce judgments of valid consent, even when it led the agent to make a choice that
was not right for them. Again, however, lacking the capacity to make autonomous decisions
(e.g., lacking the capacity to resist impulses) did reduce judgments that consent was valid.
Finally, Study 3 showed that these consent judgments carry significant downstream
consequences for judgments of ownership rights.
Our studies therefore suggest that the folk concept, like academic treatments, links the
validity of consent to the autonomy of the agent. Specifically, across three studies, we found
consistent evidence that consent is regarded as less valid when the agent’s autonomous
decision-making capacities are impaired or lacking.
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By contrast, the observed relationship between judgments of valid consent and the exercise
of autonomous capacities was inconsistent. While we did not find strong evidence for the claim
that there is no relationship between exercising autonomy and judgments of valid consent,
participants tended to treat the Mere Capacity agent’s consent as equally valid (Study 2) or
slightly more valid (Study 1) compared to someone deciding in a fully autonomous manner;
this was so even when the Mere Capacity agent was regarded as making their decision
irrationally and without regard for their own values, and as doing something that wasn’t right
for them.
An exception was Study 3, where we found that participants treated a competent agent’s
consent as slightly less valid when the vignette stated that they failed to decide in an
autonomous way. However, this result coincided with doubt that the Mere Capacity agent in
this scenario really did have the capacity to decide autonomously, as revealed by participants’
responses to the manipulation-check questions. Furthermore, the agent’s possession of
autonomous capacities played a stronger role in driving consent judgments: while the Mere
Capacity agent was still viewed, on average, as giving valid consent overall, judgments of
consent were dramatically reduced when it was stated that the agent lacked these capacities
altogether, in which case participants no longer tended to judge that consent was valid.
On balance, then, we found little support for the Exercises Capacity Hypothesis, according
to which the validity of consent is generally determined by whether an agent decides in an
autonomous (rational, authentic) manner. Although Study 3 suggests that there may be specific
circumstances in which the exercise of autonomous decision-making enhances perceptions that
consent is valid, our study findings provide stronger support for a moderate Mere Capacity
Hypothesis, according to which morally transformative consent normally only depends on
whether an agent possesses the capacity to make autonomous decisions, irrespective of whether
the decision to consent is in fact made autonomously. Of course, this finding is consistent with
the possibility, to be explored in further research, that whether an agent decides in a rational or
authentic manner may well affect perceptions of valid consent indirectly, since irrational,
inauthentic or otherwise poor decision-making may be a cue that an agent’s capacity to decide
autonomously is lacking or constrained.
Thus, we find that folk reasoning about valid consent differs from standard treatments in
medical ethics and moral philosophy that require, not only that the agent has autonomous
capacities, but also that consent decisions be formed in an autonomous way. At the same time,
our findings suggest that the folk concept of consent mirrors expert treatments in the sense that
the transformation of rights and obligations depends on the provision of consent by an
autonomous agent.
5.1. The Role of Autonomous Consent in Moral Cognition
Our findings suggest that consent judgments based on the possession of autonomous
capacities come apart from judgments of the moral wrongness of acting on that consent, instead
playing a nuanced role in downstream moral reasoning about rights and obligations.
We therefore suggest that making autonomous decisions (i.e., exercising autonomous
capacities), on the one hand, and possessing autonomous capacities, on the other, play
importantly different roles in moral reasoning about consent transactions.
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On the one hand, our studies suggest that whether an agent makes a decision in an
autonomous way affects whether their choice is thought likely to be good for them. It is thus
relevant to assessing whether others are doing something morally wrong when they act on this
decision. For instance, in Study 3, Sam was judged to have done something wrong when he
acted on Jessica’s consent to sell the bracelet even though he knew she didn’t make the decision
in a rational, authentic way and would regret it. This finding is consistent with a large literature
showing that breaking moral norms, harming others, and knowingly causing harmful
consequences affect judgments that a person is doing something morally wrong. More broadly,
this result suggests that the exercising autonomous decision-making—while not relevant to
participants’ assessments of valid consent—is relevant to their morally evaluative appraisals.
This result coheres with the dominant framework of research in moral cognition, which focuses
on how people generate morally evaluative appraisals of moral agents (especially potential
wrongdoers) within agent-victim or agent-beneficiary dyads. This wide literature has explored
how intentions, consequences and norms affect judgments of the rightness or wrongness of
actions (Crockett, 2013; Cushman & Greene, 2012; Greene, 2008; Graham et al 2013; Gray,
Young & Waytz 2012), the agent’s blameworthiness or praiseworthiness (Alicke, 2000; Malle,
Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014), the moral agent’s character (Uhlmann, Pizarro & Diermeier,
2015), and the agent’s relation to good or bad outcomes (Knobe, 2003).
Our findings underscore that these types of moral appraisals are psychologically distinct
from judgments of valid consent. Judgments of the validity of consent came apart from
appraisals of whether the consenter and consent-obtainer were acting rightly or wrongly,
making good or poor decisions, or acting in praiseworthy or blameworthy ways. Consent
judgments had a different function: a core finding of Study 3 was that the provision of
autonomous, valid consent crucially affected judgments of what other third parties were and
were not permitted to do. Specifically, the character who selfishly got a friend to agree to
selling her bracelet was perceived to be doing something morally wrong across all conditions.
Nevertheless, variations in the validity of consent determined whether ownership was in fact
transferred, whether the buyer was regarded as morally permitted to keep the item, and whether
the state was permitted to forcibly stop or reverse the transaction. This finding not only
contributes to prior work on reasoning about ownership (Friedman, Neary, Defeyter &
Malcolm, 2011), it also illuminates the importance of autonomous capacities and valid consent
to moral reasoning about the rights and duties of third parties. This is a moral dimension not
captured by existing work on moral appraisals of actions or character within the agent-patient
dyad.
We suggest, therefore, that the possession of autonomous capacities, and corresponding
judgments of valid consent, may play an important role in whether people’s decisions are
treated as authoritative. If agents possess autonomous capacities, they have not only the ability
but the right to make their own decisions;9 this status means that others are required to respect
their decisions and refrain from intervening when they consent, even if intervening would be
in the consenter’s best interest. On the other hand, if an agent lacks autonomous capacities,
9

This phenomenon raises interesting questions about possible limits on the kinds of things to which autonomous
agents are able to give valid consent, such as whether an autonomous agent is able to make a morally authoritative
decision to give up their right to make decisions for themselves—as in consensually opting into slavery. Studies
by Starmans and Friedman (2016) suggest that agents are not viewed as ownable to the extent that they are
autonomous, but that an autonomous agent may be viewed as somewhat “owned” if they consent to being owned
(Starmans and Friedman, 2016, Study 4). Future research could examine to what extent, and in what way precisely,
such consent is viewed as valid and morally transformative, if at all. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this
suggestion.
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third parties may regard the consenter’s “decision” as something to be ignored, allowing them
to paternalistically intervene for the consenter’s own good.
Future research might investigate whether this phenomenon extends to domains other than
ownership. For instance, imagine that A is immorally trying to get B to have unprotected sex,
where this isn’t what B wants, and A doesn’t care about B’s wishes, desires, or welfare. We
would expect participants to judge that A is doing something morally wrong. However, a
crucial difference may emerge between the case where B has the capacity to make an
autonomous decision but fails to exercise these capacities and the case where B lacks these
capacities altogether (e.g., because they are cognitively impaired, too young, too intoxicated,
or A exerts coercive pressure). In the latter case, we might expect participants to judge that B’s
consent is not valid, and that it would therefore be permissible, or perhaps obligatory, for third
parties to attempt to protect B by physically intervening to prevent them from having sex with
A. By contrast, in the case where B is competent but gives consent irrationally, without
accounting for the consequences or their personal desires, we might expect participants to judge
that third parties must respect B’s decision—even if it’s the wrong decision, and even if A is
immorally taking advantage of B. Moreover, we would expect participants to judge that it
would be immoral for third parties to forcibly prevent B from having sex with A (although they
may attempt to warn B or persuade B to change their mind).
The disjuncture between moral permissibility and valid consent that we documented in
Study 3 may illuminate prior research about consent-by-deception which shows that even when
someone is intentionally deceived into saying “yes” to things like sex or surgery, participants
tend to judge the interaction to be consensual (Sommers, 2020). Although the consenters in
Sommers’s vignettes were deceived, they retained normal capacities to reason and make
decisions. Furthermore, they were not forced to believe the deceiver’s testimony or prevented
from checking the information they were being given. While further research is needed, it’s
plausible that deception did not affect participants’ perception that the consenter was in full
possession of their psychological capacity to make rational and authentic choices—even
though the deception meant that the choice they made did not objectively satisfy their desires.
If so, our finding that only the capacity to make autonomous decisions is important for valid
consent could partly explain participants’ judgments that such interactions are consensual.
Furthermore, our findings suggest that participants did not necessarily think that deception was
morally permissible just because they judged the interaction to be consensual. Instead, it’s
plausible that participants judged that consent-by-deception was valid even though they also
judged that the deceiver’s actions were morally wrong, where the former judgment may have
affected downstream moral reasoning (e.g., about what kinds of punishment are appropriate
for the deceiver).
It may be that consent is regarded as valid only if the consenter is responsible for their
decision to consent. Just as agents are not regarded as forfeiting rights (i.e. being subject to
punishment) when they are not regarded as morally responsible for harmful behavior, so,
perhaps, agents are not regarded as transforming their own rights when they are not responsible
for the decision to do so. Previous work has shown that a central component of moral
responsibility is the agent’s ability to choose, which is determined in part by the possession of
cognitive and psychological capacities for rational decision-making (Alicke, 2000; Malle,
Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Schlenker et al., 1994; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995).
Accordingly, lacking autonomous decision-making capacities reduces judgments that an agent
is morally responsible (Blakey & Kremsmayer, 2018; Daigle & Demaree-Cotton, 2021;
Monroe, Brady & Malle, 2017, Study 4; Rise & Halkjelsvik 2019). Similar patterns are seen
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in lay judgments of criminal responsibility (e.g. Allen et al., 2019). Future research could
explore the link between judgments of autonomous capacity consent and judgments of
responsibility.
Finally, a core finding of the present studies was that the relationship between autonomous
decision-making capacities and judgments of valid consent held across a variety of domains—
including sexual consent, medical consent, consent to entry and search, and consent to property
transfer. This provides novel evidence that people possess a domain-general moral concept of
autonomous, valid consent that they employ across very different domains. The apparent
domain-generality of reasoning about autonomous, valid consent further supports our
contention that consent forms an important but heretofore relatively neglected component of
moral cognition.
5.2.Limitations
We used vignettes that explicitly manipulated information about the consenter’s
autonomy. In real life, however, people often lack access to explicit information about an
agent’s decision-making capacities. Instead, it’s likely that they infer such information from
what is known about the consenter’s circumstances, behavior and environment. Relevant cues
could include age, mental illness, developmental disability, intoxication, history of trauma or
abuse, the consenter’s past behaviors, displays of emotion or pain, or social group stereotypes
(e.g. Blakey & Kremsmayer, 2018; Vonasch, Baumeister, & Mele, 2018). Future research
could further investigate which kinds of real-life circumstances are regarded as autonomy- and
consent-undermining. For example, future research could examine whether, and in what
circumstances, intoxication is regarded as undermining an agent’s capacity for autonomous
decision-making and therefore their ability to give valid consent, as opposed to being perceived
as a state that merely leads competent agents to make bad decisions, without affecting the
validity of their consent.
Relatedly, Study 3, in which an agent was temporarily incapacitated due to medication,
yielded much lower ratings of valid consent and autonomy than did Studies 1 and 2, in which
the agent’s lack of decision-making capacity was unexplained. The lower ratings in Study 3 is
likely due to the fact that the incapacity was wholly general (they were unable to engage in any
kind of autonomous reasoning or decision-making), and was explained by a concrete condition
(heavy medication). In Study 2, the agent in Lacks Capacity lacked a specific component of
autonomous decision-making capacity (for example, lacking the ability to control impulses),
while in Study 1, the incapacity was generalized but not explained by any concrete condition.
In addition, unlike in Studies 1 and 2, the incapacity in Study 3 was temporary, not a permanent
condition.
Finally, while the present studies suggest that possessing autonomous decision-making
capacities, but not exercising those capacities, is necessary for judgments that consent is valid,
we do not expect that this is sufficient. For instance, in addition to the possession of
autonomous capacities, valid consent likely requires that “yes” is explicitly or implicitly
communicated, and that the agent’s decision is free from external interference such as coercion.
Further research is needed to examine other necessary conditions for judgments of valid
consent.
5.3.Implications for public health and policy
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Our research suggests that consent education and anti-sexual-violence campaigns may be
more successful to the extent that the emphasize the way that alcohol, pressure, or manipulation
undermine the consenter’s capacity to make an autonomous decision rather than focusing on
how they impair the quality of decisions (cf. Beres, 2014; Bonnefon, Shariff, & Rahwan, 2020).
Secondly, our findings suggest that sex may be regarded as consensual even if one party is
wronging the other (Study 3), even if sex is not the right choice for the consenter (Studies 1
and 2), and even if sex is influenced by unwanted impulse, peer pressure, or irrational belief
(Study 2). Therefore, policies and educational campaigns may be more successful in targeting
harmful and immoral behaviors by not only appealing to “consent” but to additional moral
concepts as well (e.g., respect, care, harm; see Carmody, 2005; Carmody & Ovenden, 2013).
Finally, our findings may also inform research on victim-blaming (Niemi & Young, 2014,
2016), in that victim-blaming narratives may capitalize on the role of autonomous capacity in
valid consent. Emphasizing the victim’s capacities to make their own decisions may contribute
to the assignment of moral obligations to victims to avoid sexual defilement, judgments that
they have the capacity to avoid defilement, and judgments of causal responsibility for sexual
assault, all of which contribute to ascriptions of moral responsibility to victims (Niemi &
Young, 2014). More than that, however, our findings suggest that emphasis on the consenter’s
capacities may result in inappropriate judgments that the assault was consensual, protecting
the assaulter from third party punishment and interference even if they are regarded as morally
responsible for wrongdoing.
6. Conclusion
Before these studies, it remained an open possibility that “valid consent” as a rich and
normatively complex force existed only as a technical concept used in philosophical, legal and
academic domains. We found, however, that the folk concept of consent involves normative
distinctions between valid and invalid consent that are sensitive to the consenter’s autonomy,
even if the linguistic utterance of “yes” is held constant, and that this concept plays an important
role in moral reasoning.
Specifically, the studies presented here examined the relationship between autonomy and
intuitive judgments of valid consent in several domains: medical procedures, sexual relations,
police searches, and agreements between buyers and sellers. Across scenarios, we found that
judgments of valid consent carried a specific relationship to autonomy: whether an agent
possesses the mental capacity to make decisions in an autonomous way has a consistent impact
on whether their consent is regarded as valid, and thus whether it was regarded as morally
transformative of the rights and obligations of the consenter and of third parties. Yet, whether
the agent in fact makes their decision in an autonomous, rational way—based on their own
authentic values and what is right for them—has little impact on perceptions of consent or
associated rights, although it has relevance for whether the consent-obtainer is acting wrongly.
Autonomy thus has a subtle role in the ordinary reasoning about morally transformative
consent, where consent given by an agent with autonomous capacities has a distinctive role in
downstream moral reasoning.
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Appendices/Supplemental Online Materials
Appendix A: Supplemental Analyses
1. Study 1 Results, With and Without Exclusions
Unless noted otherwise, shared superscripts indicate that means do not differ significantly from
one another as revealed by fitting a linear mixed model with autonomy condition included as
a fixed factor and domain included as a random factor. Significance of fixed effects was
assessed via t-tests using Satterthwaite’s method.
Where an analysis of a dependent variable indicated a significant difference (p < .05) only
after exclusions but not before, or vice versa, the analysis is shaded grey.
a. N per condition
Before
After
exclusions
exclusions
Exercises Capacity N = 155
N = 146
Mere Capacity
N = 146
N = 91
Lacks Capacity
N = 149
N=127
Total
N = 450
N = 364
Attention check failure rates differ significantly by
condition, χ2(6, N = 445) = 69.65, p < .001.
b. Manipulation checks
N = 450 (before exclusions)
Mean (SD)

N = 364 (after exclusions)
Mean (SD)

Mean rational capacity rating in each of 3 conditions
E.g., “Marvin has the ability to make rational decisions.”
Our pre-registration states that Lacks Capacity condition will be lower than the other two
conditions on this measure.
Exercises Capacity

6.16 (1.14), n = 155a

6.29 (0.96), n = 146a

Mere Capacity

6.03 (1.09), n = 149a

6.38 (0.85), n = 91a

Lacks Capacity

2.71 (1.72), n = 146b

2.35 (1.41), n = 127b

Mean authentic capacity rating in each of 3 conditions
E.g., “Marvin has the ability to be true to himself when making decisions.”
Our pre-registration states that Lacks Capacity condition will be lower than the other two
conditions on this measure.
Exercises Capacity

6.19 (1.02), n = 155a

6.32 (0.77), n = 146a

Mere Capacity

5.85 (1.12), n = 149b

6.15 (0.93), n = 91a
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Lacks Capacity

3.36 (1.82), n = 146c

2.98 (1.56), n = 127b

Mean rational exercise rating in each of 3 conditions
E.g., “Marvin made this particular decision rationally.”
Our pre-registration states that Exercises Capacity condition will be higher than the other
two conditions on this measure.
Exercises Capacity

5.88 (1.27), n = 155a

5.99 (1.15), n = 146a

Mere Capacity

3.48 (1.84), n = 149b

3.19 (1.81), n = 91b

Lacks Capacity

2.70 (1.63), n = 146c

2.35 (1.38), n = 127c

Mean authentic exercise rating in each of 3 conditions
E.g., “When Marvin said ‘yes’ to having surgery, he was not being true to himself.”
(reverse-scored)
Our pre-registration states that Exercises Capacity condition will be higher than the other
two conditions on this measure (once it is reverse-scored).
Exercises Capacity

5.67 (1.45), n = 155a

5.81 (1.31), n = 146a

Mere Capacity

3.95 (1.67), n = 149b

4.04 (1.68), n = 91b

Lacks Capacity

3.58 (1.38), n = 146c

3.69 (1.34), n = 127b

c. Judgments of valid consent
Our preregistration states that we will test whether condition predicts consent, and if so, will
conduct pairwise comparisons comparing Mere Capacity to Exercises Capacity, and Mere
Capacity to Lacks Capacity.
N = 450 (before exclusions)
Cronbach’s alpha for
three consent items

0.71

N = 364 (after exclusions)
0.74

Mean rating of valid consent (composite measure) in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

5.87 (1.18), n = 155a

5.98 (1.08), n = 146a

Mere Capacity

5.91 (1.16), n = 149a

6.38 (0.84), n = 91b

Lacks Capacity

4.71 (1.39), n = 146b

4.78 (1.41), n = 127c

Difference between mean consent ratings in each of 3 conditions, adjusting for
vignette domain (random factor)
Exercises Capacity vs.
Mere Capacity

b = 0.05, SE = 0.14, t = 0.35, p
= .73, CI [-0.23, 0.32]

b = 0.36, SE = 0.15, t = 2.35, p
= .019, CI [0.06, 0.65]

Exercises Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -1.16, SE = 0.14, t = -8.32,
p < .001, CI [-1.44, -0.89]

b = -1.21, SE = 0.14, t = -8.81,
p < .001, CI [-1.48, -0.94]
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Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -1.21, SE = 0.14, t = -8.58,
p < .001, CI [-1.49, -0.93]

b = -1.56, SE = 0.16, t = -10.05,
p < .001, CI [-1.87, -1.26]

d. Judgments of right choice: e.g., “Having surgery was probably the right choice for
Marvin.”/“Having sex with Frank was probably the right choice for Ellen.”/“Allowing
the police officers to search his home was probably the right choice for Johnny.”
Our pre-registration states that we predict that comparison between Mere Capacity and
Exercises Capacity to be significant, as well as the comparison between Mere Capacity and
Lacks Capacity.
N = 450 (before exclusions)

N = 364 (after exclusions)

Mean right choice rating in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

5.03 (1.61), n = 155a

5.05 (1.57), n = 146a

Mere Capacity

4.19 (1.57), n = 149b

4.19 (1.50), n = 91b

Lacks Capacity

3.71 (1.78), n = 146c

3.47 (1.73), n = 127c

Difference between mean right choice ratings in each of 3 conditions, adjusting for
vignette domain (random factor)
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

b = -.82, SE = 0.17, t = -4.79, p
< .001, CI [-1.16, -0.49]

b = -1.01, SE = 0.19, t = -5.43, p
< .001, CI [-1.38, -0.65]

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

b = -1.31, SE = 0.17, t = -7.58, p b = -1.60, SE = 0.17, t = -9.47, p
< .001, CI [-1.65, -0.97]
< .001, CI [-1.93, -1.26]

Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -0.49, SE = 0.17, t = -2.79, p b = -0.58, SE = 0.19, t = -3.05, p
= .005, CI [-0.83, -0.14]
= .002, CI [-0.96, -0.21]

e. Judgments of morality: “Under these circumstances, it would be morally wrong for
the doctor to proceed with the surgery.”/ “Under these circumstances, it would be
morally wrong for Frank to have sex with Ellen.”/ “Under these circumstances it
would be morally wrong for the police officers to enter and search Johnny’s home.
home.”
Our pre-registration states that as a secondary analysis, we will test whether morality
judgments exhibit the same pattern as consent.

N = 450 (before exclusions)

N = 364 (after exclusions)

Mean morality rating in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

2.44 (1.79), n = 155a

2.35 (1.75), n = 146a

Mere Capacity

2.75 (1.75), n = 149a

2.14 (1.44), n = 91a

Lacks Capacity

4.59 (1.86), n = 146b

4.54 (1.89), n = 127b
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Difference between mean morality ratings in each of 3 conditions, adjusting for
vignette domain (random factor)
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

b = .31, SE = 0.20, t = 1.57, p =
0.12, CI [-0.08, 0.07]

b = -0.09, SE = 0.22, t = -0.42, p
= .68, CI [-0.53, 0.34]

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

b = 2.17, SE = 0.20, t = 10.88, p
< .001, CI [1.78, 2.56]

b = 2.20, SE = 0.20, t = 10.99, p
< .001, CI [1.81, 2.60]

Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = 1.86, SE = 0.20, t = 9.23, p
< .001, CI [1.46, 2.25]

b = 2.30, SE = 0.23, t = 10.09, p
< .001, CI [1.85, 2.75]

f. Judgments of freedom: “Marvin freely chose to have surgery”/“Ellen freely chose to
have sex with Frank”/“Johnny freely chose to allow the police officers to enter and
search his home.”
Our pre-registration states that as a secondary analysis, we will test whether freedom
judgments exhibit the same pattern as consent.

N = 450 (before exclusions)

N = 364 (after exclusions)

Mean freedom rating in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

6.32 (0.95), n = 155a

6.46 (0.68), n = 146a

Mere Capacity

6.28 (0.85), n = 149a

6.44 (0.73), n = 91a

Lacks Capacity

4.80 (1.63), n = 146b

4.68 (1.67), n = 127b

Difference between mean freedom ratings in each of 3 conditions, adjusting for
vignette domain (random factor)
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

b = -.04, SE = 0.14, t = -0.30, p = b = -0.05, SE = 0.15, t = -0.31, p
.77, CI [-0.31, 0.23]
= .75, CI [-0.34, 0.25]

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

b = -1.52, SE = 0.14, t = -11.15,
p < .001, CI [-1.79, -1.25]

b = 1.79, SE = 0.14, t = -13.13, p
< .001, CI [-2.05, -1.52]

Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -1.48, SE = 0.14, t = -10.75,
p < .001, CI [-1.75, -1.21]

b = -1.74, SE = 0.15, t = -11.28,
p < .001, CI [-2.04, -1.44]

2. Study 2 Results, With and Without Exclusions
Unless noted otherwise, shared superscripts indicate that means do not differ significantly from
one another as revealed by fitting a linear mixed model with autonomy condition included as
a fixed factor and domain included as a random factor. Significance of fixed effects was
assessed via t-tests using Satterthwaite’s method.
Where an analysis of a dependent variable indicated a significant difference (p < .05) only
after exclusions but not before, or vice versa, the analysis is shaded grey.
a. N per condition
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Before
exclusions

After
exclusions

Exercises Capacity

N = 212

N = 157

Mere Capacity

N = 211

N = 95

Lacks Capacity

N = 212

N =132

No condition (e.g.,
participant did not
complete survey)

N=4

Total

N = 639

N = 384

Attention check failure rates differ significantly by
condition, χ2(2, N = 631) = 38.32, p < .001.
b. Manipulation checks
N = 639 (before exclusions)
Mean (SD)

N = 384 (after exclusions)
Mean (SD)

Mean rational capacity rating in each of 3 conditions
“Marvin has the ability to make rational decisions.”
Our pre-registration states that Lacks Capacity condition will be lower than the other two
conditions on this measure.
Exercises Capacity

6.21 (0.98), n = 205a

6.46 (0.73), n = 157a

Mere Capacity

5.83 (1.17), n = 206b

6.09 (0.91), n = 95b

Lacks Capacity

3.77 (1.91), n = 212c

2.91 (1.58), n = 132c

Mean authentic capacity rating in each of 3 conditions
“Marvin has the ability to be true to himself when making decisions.”
Our pre-registration states that Lacks Capacity condition will be lower than the other two
conditions on this measure.
Exercises Capacity

6.00 (1.09), n = 208a

6.30 (0.80), n = 157a

Mere Capacity

5.85 (1.14), n = 208a

6.03 (0.95), n = 95a

Lacks Capacity

4.02 (1.73), n = 212b

3.29 (1.56), n = 132b

Mean general autonomous capacity rating in each of 3 conditions
“Marvin has the ability to shape his own life freely according to his own values and what is
right for him.”
Our pre-registration states that Lacks Capacity condition will be lower than the other two
conditions on this measure.
Exercises Capacity

6.16 (1.07), n = 207a

6.47 (0.71), n = 157a

Mere Capacity

5.97 (0.95), n = 207a

6.06 (0.88), n = 95b

Lacks Capacity

4.16 (1.79), n = 212b

3.45 (1.65), n = 132c

Mean rational exercise rating in each of 3 conditions
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“Marvin made this particular decision rationally.”
Our pre-registration states that Exercises Capacity condition will be higher than the other
two conditions on this measure.
Exercises Capacity

6.09 (1.16), n = 208a

6.41 (0.85), n = 156a

Mere Capacity

3.91 (1.94), n = 207b

2.92 (1.60), n = 95b

Lacks Capacity

3.43 (2.03), n = 212c

2.39 (1.50), n = 132c

Mean authentic exercise rating in each of 3 conditions
“When Marvin said ‘yes’ to having surgery, he was not being true to himself.” (reversescored)
Our pre-registration states that Exercises Capacity condition will be higher than the other
two conditions on this measure (once it is reverse-scored).
Exercises Capacity

5.04 (2.00), n = 209a

5.69 (1.66), n = 157a

Mere Capacity

2.89 (1.56), n = 207b

3.11 (1.61), n = 95b

Lacks Capacity

2.97 (1.51), n = 212b

3.05 (1.60), n = 132b

Mean general autonomous exercise rating in each of 3 conditions
“The way Marvin made this particular decision expressed an ability to shape his life freely
according to his own values and what is right for him.”
Our pre-registration states that Exercises Capacity condition will be higher than the other
two conditions on this measure.
Exercises Capacity

6.08 (1.05), n = 209a

6.32 (0.82), n = 157a

Mere Capacity

4.85 (1.70), n = 207b

4.43 (1.80), n = 95b

Lacks Capacity

4.00 (1.90), n = 212c

3.19 (1.76), n = 132c

c. Judgments of valid consent (composite measure)
Our preregistration states that we expected consent judgments to be higher in Mere Capacity
than Lacks Capacity, and to find no significant difference between Exercises Capacity and
Mere Capacity.
N = 639 (before exclusions)
Cronbach’s alpha for
three consent items

0.75

N = 384 (after exclusions)
0.73

Mean rating of valid consent (composite measure) in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

5.67 (1.49), n = 210a

6.15 (1.23), n = 157a

Mere Capacity

5.18 (1.55), n = 207b

5.93 (1.17), n = 95a

Lacks Capacity

4.74 (1.37), n = 212c

5.21 (1.28), n = 132b

Difference between mean consent ratings in each of 3 conditions, adjusting for failure
type (random factor)
Exercises Capacity vs.
Mere Capacity

b = -0.49, SE = 0.14, t = -3.41,
p < .001, CI [-0.77, -0.21]

b = -0.22, SE = 0.16, t = -1.38,
p = .167, CI [-0.54, -0.09]
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Exercises Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -0.93, SE = 0.14, t = -6.48,
p < .001, CI [-1.21, -0.65]

b = -0.94, SE = 0.15, t = -6.42,
p < .001, CI [-1.22, -0.65]

Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -0.44, SE = 0.14, t = -3.04,
p = .002, CI [-0.72, -0.15]

b = -0.71 SE = 0.17, t = -4.30, p
< .001, CI [-1.04, -0.39]

d. Judgments of morality: “Under these circumstances, it would be morally wrong for
the doctor to proceed with the surgery.”
Our pre-registration states that as a secondary analysis, we will test whether morality
judgments exhibit the same pattern as consent.
N = 639 (before exclusions)

N = 384 (after exclusions)

Mean morality rating in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

5.38 (2.00), n = 208a

6.06 (1.58), n = 157a

Mere Capacity

4.38 (2.03), n = 208b

5.27 (1.67), n = 95b

Lacks Capacity

3.67 (1.79), n = 212c

4.02 (1.75), n = 132c

Difference between mean morality ratings in each of 3 conditions, adjusting for
failure type (random factor)
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

b = -0.99, SE = 0.19, t = -5.22, p
< .001, CI [-1.36, -0.62]

b = -0.77, SE = 0.21, t = -3.56, p
< .001, CI [-1.19, -0.34]

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

b = -1.70, SE = 0.19, t = -9.01, p
< .001, CI [-2.07, -1.33]

b = -2.02, SE = 0.20, t = -10.34,
p < .001, CI [-2.40, -1.64]

Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -0.71, SE = 0.19, t = -3.76, p
< .001, CI [-1.08, -0.34]

b = -1.26, SE = 0.22, t = -5.64, p
< .001, CI [-1.69, -0.82]

e. Judgments of freedom: “Marvin freely chose to have surgery.”
Our pre-registration states that as a secondary analysis, we will test whether freedom
judgments exhibit the same pattern as consent.
N = 639 (before exclusions)

N = 384 (after exclusions)

Mean freedom rating in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

6.20 (1.18), n = 208a

6.53 (0.84), n = 157a

Mere Capacity

5.74 (1.21), n = 207b

5.87 (1.31), n = 95a

Lacks Capacity

4.92 (1.67), n = 212c

4.67 (1.75), n = 132b

Difference between mean freedom ratings in each of 3 conditions, adjusting for
failure type (random factor)
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

b = -0.45, SE = 0.13, t = -3.45, p
< .001, CI [-0.71, -0.20]

b = -0.69, SE = 0.16, t = -4.22, p
< .001, CI [-1.01, -0.37]

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

b = -1.28, SE = 0.13, t = -9.85, p
< .001, CI [-1.54, -1.03]

b = -1.88, SE = 0.15, t = -12.70,
p < .001, CI [-2.18, -1.59]
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Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -0.83, SE = 0.13, t = -6.37, p
< .001, CI [-1.09, -0.58]

b = -1.19, SE = 0.17, t = -7.08, p
< .001, CI [-1.53, -0.87]

3. Study 3 results with and without exclusions
Unless noted otherwise, shared superscripts indicate that means do not differ significantly
from one another as revealed by fitting a linear model with autonomy condition as a fixed
factor. Significance of fixed effects was assessed via t-tests using Satterthwaite’s method.
Where an analysis of a dependent variable indicated a significant difference (p < .05) only
after exclusions but not before, or vice versa, the analysis is shaded grey.
a. N per condition
Before
exclusions

After
exclusions

Exercises Capacity

N = 101

N = 43

Mere Capacity

N = 100

N = 49

Lacks Capacity

N = 102

N = 61

Total

N = 303

N = 153

Attention check failure rates differ significantly by
condition, χ2(2, N = 303) = 11.35, p = .003.
b. Manipulation checks
N = 303 (before exclusions)
Mean (SD)

N = 153 (after exclusions)
Mean (SD)

Mean rational capacity rating in each of 3 conditions
“When Sam asked whether he could sell the bracelet, Jessica had the ability to make a
rational decision.”
Exercises Capacity

5.58 (1.25), n = 101a

5.88 (1.12), n = 43a

Mere Capacity

5.02 (1.56), n = 100b

4.96 (1.73), n = 49b

Lacks Capacity

3.49 (2.28), n = 102c

2.11 (1.60), n = 61c

Mean authentic capacity rating in each of 3 conditions
“Jessica had the ability to be true to herself when making a decision about whether to let
Sam sell the bracelet.”
Exercises Capacity

5.49 (1.30), n = 101a

5.74 (1.18), n = 43a

Mere Capacity

5.02 (1.64), n = 100a

4.80 (1.86), n = 49b

Lacks Capacity

3.63 (2.27), n = 102b

2.25 (1.70), n = 61c

Mean rational exercise rating in each of 3 conditions
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“Jessica made the decision to say ‘yes’ rationally.”
Exercises Capacity

5.34 (1.45), n = 101a

5.84 (1.17), n = 43a

Mere Capacity

4.48 (1.75), n = 100b

3.88 (1.79), n = 49b

Lacks Capacity

3.77 (2.32), n = 102c

2.41 (1.85), n = 61c

Mean authentic exercise rating in each of 3 conditions
“When Jessica said ‘yes’ to Sam’s selling the bracelet, she was not being true to herself.”
(reverse-scored)
Exercises Capacity

3.65 (1.79), n = 101a

4.86 (1.68), n = 43a

Mere Capacity

2.84 (1.33), n = 100b

3.12 (1.49), n = 49b

Lacks Capacity

2.11 (1.07), n = 102c

1.93 (0.98), n = 61c

c. Judgments of valid consent
Our pre-registration predicted that the Lacks Capacity condition will yield lower consent
ratings than the Mere Capacity condition.

Cronbach’s alpha
for three consent
items

N = 303 (before exclusions)
Mean (SD)

N = 153 (after exclusions)
Mean (SD)

0.76

0.89

Mean rating of valid consent (composite measure) in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

4.60 (1.51), n = 101a

5.84 (1.27), n = 43a

Mere Capacity

4.25 (1.34), n = 100a

4.80 (1.56), n = 49b

Lacks Capacity

3.02 (1.27), n = 102b

2.75 (1.53), n = 61c

Omnibus F Test examining whether mean consent ratings differ by condition
F(2, 300) = 37.29, p < .001

F(2, 150) = 59.82, p < .001

Difference between mean consent ratings in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

b = 0.34, SE = 0.19, t = 1.82, p =
.069, CI [-0.74, -0.03]

b = 1.03, SE = 0.31, t = 3.36, p =
.001, CI [-1.64, -0.43]

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

b = 1.59, SE = 0.19, t = 8.22, p <
.001, CI [-1.97, -1.21]

b = 3.08, SE = 0.29, t = 10.51, p
< .001, CI [-3.66, -2.50]

Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = 1.23, SE = 0.19, t = 6.37, p <
.001, CI [-1.61, -0.85]

b = 2.05, SE = 0.28, t = 7.25, p <
.001, CI [-2.61, -1.49]

d. Judgments of (1) ownership transfer: composite continuous measure and (2) binary
ownership measure (“Who is the rightful owner of the bracelet?” Jessica/Melanie)
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For the continuous measure, our pre-registration states that we predict the Lacks Capacity
condition will yield lower ratings of ownership transfer than the Mere Capacity condition. For
the binary measure, the pre-registration states that we will conduct Fisher’s exact tests
analyzing whether the percentage of participants answering “Melanie” differs between the
autonomy conditions. We predicted lower rates in the Lacks Capacity condition.

Cronbach’s alpha
for five ownership
items

N = 303 (before exclusions)
Mean (SD)

N = 153 (after exclusions)
Mean (SD)

0.91

0.91

Mean rating of ownership transfer (composite continuous measure) in each of 3
conditions
Exercises Capacity

4.29 (1.54), n = 101a

5.53 (1.36), n = 43a

Mere Capacity

4.00 (1.44), n = 100a

4.71 (1.58), n = 49b

Lacks Capacity

3.11 (1.14), n = 102b

3.18 (1.40), n = 61c

Omnibus F Test examining whether mean ownership transfer ratings differ by
condition
F(2, 300) = 19.90, p < .001

F(2, 150) = 35.60, p < .001

Difference between mean ownership transfer ratings in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

b = 0.29 SE = 0.20, t = 1.46, p =
.15, CI [-0.67, 0.10]

b = 0.82, SE = 0.31, t = 2.69, p =
.008, CI [-1.41, -0.22]

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

b = 1.18, SE = 0.19, t = 6.05, p <
.001, CI [-1.56, -0.79]

b = 2.35, SE = 0.29, t = 8.14, p <
.001, CI [-2.92, -1.78]

Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = 0.98, SE = 0.20, t = 4.57, p <
.001, CI [-1.27, -0.51]

b = 1.53, SE = 0.28, t = 5.51, p <
.001, CI [-2.08, -0.98]

Percentage concluding that ownership transferred to the recipient Melanie (binary
measure) in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

46.53%, n = 101a

81.40%, n = 43a

Mere Capacity

40.00%, n = 100a

57.14%, n = 49b

Lacks Capacity

20.59%, n = 102b

21.31%, n = 61c

Fisher’s exact tests comparing rates at which participants concluded ownership had
transferred to Melanie across conditions.
We report chi-square test statistics as well.
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

OR = 0.77, p = .39, CI [.42,
1.39]
Χ2(1) = .628, p = .43

OR = 0.31, p = .014, CI [0.10,
0.86]
Χ2(1) = 5.17, p = .023

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

OR = 0.30, p < .001, CI [0.15,
0.58]; Χ2(1) = 14.19, p < .001

OR = 0.06, p < .001, CI [0.02,
0.18]; Χ2(1) = 34.26, p < .001
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Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

OR = 0.39, p = .003, CI [0.19,
0.76]; Χ2(1) = 8.13, p = .004

OR = 0.21, p < .001, CI [0.08,
0.50]; Χ2(1) = 13.43, p < .001

Linear regression predicting ownership transfer judgments from consent judgments,
adjusting for condition. The relationship between ownership transfer and consent
judgments varied by condition; thus we interact consent and condition.
b = -0.83, SE = .07, t = -11.68, p
< .001, CI [-0.97, -0.69]

b = -0.80, SE = .10, t = -8.16, p <
.001, CI [-0.99, -0.61]

e. Judgments of morality: “Under these circumstances, it was morally wrong for Sam to
proceed with selling the bracelet.” (reverse-scored)
Our pre-registration stated that as a secondary analysis we would examine the effect of
condition on morality judgments.
N = 303 (before exclusions)
Mean (SD)

N = 153 (after exclusions)
Mean (SD)

Mean morality rating in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

3.16 (1.82), n = 101a

4.14 (2.01), n = 43a

Mere Capacity

2.44 (1.47), n = 100b

2.43 (1.62), n = 49b

Lacks Capacity

1.84 (0.96), n = 102c

1.61 (0.94), n = 61c

Omnibus F Test examining whether mean morality ratings differ by condition
F(2, 300) = 20.71, p < .001

F(2, 150) = 35.27, p < .001

Difference between mean morality ratings in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

b = -0.72, SE = 0.21, t = -3.49, p
< .001, CI [-1.12, -0.31]

b = -1.71, SE = 0.32, t = -5.38, p
< .001, CI [-2.34, -1.08]

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

b = -1.32, SE = 0.20, t = -6.43, p
< .001, CI [-1.72, -0.91]

b = -2.53, SE = 0.30, t = -8.36, p
< .001, CI [-3.13, -1.93]

Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -0.60, SE = 0.21, t = -2.91, p
= .003, CI [-1.00, -0.19]

b = -0.82, SE = 0.29, t = -2.81, p
= .006, CI [-1.40, -0.24]

f. Judgments of right choice: “Saying ‘yes’ to selling the bracelet was probably the right
choice for Jessica at the time.”
Our pre-registration stated that as a secondary analysis we would examine the effect of
condition on judgments of right choice.

N = 303 (before exclusions)
Mean (SD)

N = 153 (after exclusions)
Mean (SD)
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Mean right choice rating in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

4.71 (1.63), n = 101a

4.23 (1.66), n = 43a

Mere Capacity

3.95 (1.84), n = 100b

3.20 (1.68), n = 49b

Lacks Capacity

3.79 (2.28), n = 102b

2.39 (1.76), n = 61c

Difference between mean right choice ratings in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

b = -0.76, SE = 0.27, t = -2.79, p b = -1.03, SE = 0.36, t = -2.88, p
= .006, CI [-1.30, -0.22]
= .004, CI [-1.73, -0.32]

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

b = -0.92, SE = 0.27, t = -3.38, p b = -1.84, SE = 0.34, t = -5.40, p
< .001, CI [-1.45, -0.38]
< .001, CI [-2.51, -1.17]

Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -0.16, SE = 0.27, t = -0.57, p b = -0.81, SE = 0.33, t = -2.47, p
= .57, CI [-0.69, -0.38]
= .015, CI [-1.46, -0.16]

g. Judgments of freedom: “Jessica freely chose to sell her bracelet.”
Our pre-registration stated that as a secondary analysis we would examine the effect of
condition on freedom judgments.
N = 303 (before exclusions)
Mean (SD)

N = 153 (after exclusions)
Mean (SD)

Mean freedom rating in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity

5.15 (1.53), n = 101a

5.58 (1.42), n = 43a

Mere Capacity

4.79 (1.74), n = 100a

4.67 (1.84), n = 49b

Lacks Capacity

3.69 (2.37), n = 102b

2.30 (1.74), n = 61c

Difference between mean freedom ratings in each of 3 conditions
Exercises Capacity
vs. Mere Capacity

B = -0.36, SE = 0.27, t = -1.33, p
= .19, CI [-0.89, -0.17]

b = -0.91, SE = 0.35, t = -2.57, p
= .011, CI [-1.61, -0.21]

Exercises Capacity
vs. Lacks Capacity

b = -1.46, SE = 0.27, t = -5.44, p
< .001, CI [-1.99, -0.93]

b = -3.29, SE = 0.34, t = -9.77, p
< .001, CI [-3.95, -2.62]

Mere Capacity vs.
Lacks Capacity

b = -1.10, SE = 0.27, t = -4.09, p
< .001, CI [-1.63, -0.57]

b = -2.38, SE = 0.32, t = -7.34, p
< .001, CI [-3.02, -1.74]

Appendix B: Stimuli
1. STUDY 1 STIMULI
a. Study 1 vignettes by condition
MEDICAL
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Marvin has been in physical therapy for ankle pain. One day his doctor asks him whether he wishes
to undergo elective surgery to repair the tendon. The doctor explains that the surgery carries some
risks, as all surgeries do, but if all goes well it could potentially completely cure his ankle pain.
Exercises Capacity

Mere Capacity

Lacks Capacity

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult. He is perfectly capable
of weighing up pros and cons;
thinking through the choice he
faces; and making decisions
based on what is best for him,
which options align with his
personal values, and what he
really wants.

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult. He is perfectly capable
of weighing up pros and cons;
thinking through the choice he
faces; and making decisions
based on what is best for him,
which options align with his
personal values, and what he
really wants.

Marvin is not able and
intelligent like most adults. He
is completely incapable of
weighing up pros and cons;
thinking through the choice he
faces; or making decisions
based on what is best for him,
which options align with his
personal values, or what he
really wants.

And he does so in this instance.
After thinking things through
very carefully--and with
careful regard for the pros and
cons, and whether it aligns with
his personal values and what he
really wants--Marvin says ‘yes’
to the surgery.

But he does not do so in this
instance. Without thinking
things through even a little bit-and with absolutely no regard
for the pros and cons, or
whether it aligns with his
personal values and what he
really wants--Marvin says ‘yes’
to the surgery.

So he does not do so in this
instance. Without thinking
things through even a little bit-and with absolutely no regard
for the pros and cons, or
whether it aligns with his
personal values and what he
really wants--Marvin says ‘yes’
to the surgery.

SEXUAL
Ellen and Frank meet in a night class. They go on several dates. At the end of their last date, Frank
asks Ellen to have sex with him. He adds, “I know we haven’t known each other very long, but I’ve
been enjoying our time together, and this feels right to me.”
Exercises Capacity

Mere Capacity

Lacks Capacity

Ellen is an intelligent, able
adult. She is perfectly capable
of weighing up pros and cons;
thinking through the choice she
faces; and making decisions
based on what is best for her,
which options align with her
personal values, and what she
really wants.

Ellen is an intelligent, able
adult. She is perfectly capable
of weighing up pros and cons;
thinking through the choice she
faces; and making decisions
based on what is best for her,
which options align with her
personal values, and what she
really wants.

Ellen is not able and intelligent
like most adults. She is
completely incapable of
weighing up pros and cons;
thinking through the choice she
faces; or making decisions
based on what is best for her,
which options align with her
personal values, or what she
really wants.

And she does so in this
instance. After thinking things
through very carefully--and
with careful regard for the pros
and cons, and whether it aligns
with her personal values and
what she really wants--Ellen

But she does not do so in this
instance. Without thinking
things through even a little bit-and with absolutely no regard
for the pros and cons, or
whether it aligns with her
personal values and what she

So she does not do so in this
instance. Without thinking
things through even a little bit-and with absolutely no regard
for the pros and cons, or
whether it aligns with her
personal values and what she
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says ‘yes’ to having sex with
Frank.

really wants--Ellen says ‘yes’
to having sex with Frank.

really wants--Ellen says ‘yes’
to having sex with Frank.

POLICE ENTRY
Johnny hears someone knock on his apartment door. Two men are standing outside. They say,
“Police here. Can we come in?” Johnny asks through the door, “What for?” One of the police
officers says, “We are looking for drugs and drug paraphernalia. We got an anonymous call
reporting drug dealing in this building. So can we come in?”
Exercises Capacity

Mere Capacity

Lacks Capacity

Johnny is an intelligent, able
adult. He is perfectly capable
of weighing up pros and cons;
thinking through the choice he
faces; and making decisions
based on what is best for him,
which options align with his
personal values, and what he
really wants.

Johnny is an intelligent, able
adult. He is perfectly capable
of weighing up pros and cons;
thinking through the choice he
faces; and making decisions
based on what is best for him,
which options align with his
personal values, and what he
really wants.

Johnny is not able and
intelligent like most adults. He
is completely incapable of
weighing up pros and cons;
thinking through the choice he
faces; or making decisions
based on what is best for him,
which options align with his
personal values, or what he
really wants.

And he does so in this instance.
After thinking things through
very carefully--and with
careful regard for the pros and
cons, and whether it aligns with
his personal values and what he
really wants--Johnny says ‘yes’
to letting the police search his
apartment.

But he does not do so in this
instance. Without thinking
things through even a little bit-and with absolutely no regard
for the pros and cons, or
whether it aligns with his
personal values and what he
really wants--Johnny says ‘yes’
to letting the police search his
apartment.

So he does not do so in this
instance. Without thinking
things through even a little bit-and with absolutely no regard
for the pros and cons, or
whether it aligns with his
personal values and what he
really wants--Johnny says ‘yes’
to letting the police search his
apartment.

b. Study 1 measures
“X” and “Y” replaced to refer to the relevant agents and “z” replaced with the relevant
action, according to vignette viewed by the participant.
Consent
Consent 1: X had Y’s permission to proceed with z.
Consent 2: If X proceeds with z-ing now, he’ll be acting without Y’s consent.
Consent 3: Y’s ‘yes’ didn’t count as consent.
Morality: Under these circumstances, it would be morally wrong for Y to proceed
with z-ing.
Freedom: Y freely chose to z.
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Right Choice: Z-ing was probably the right choice for X.
Manipulation checks
Rational capacity: Y has the ability to make rational decisions.
Rational exercise: Y made this particular decision rationally.
Authentic capacity: Y has the ability to be true to him[her]self when making
decisions.
Authentic exercise: When Y said ‘yes’ to z-ing, [s]he was not being true to
him[her]self.
c. Study 1 attention checks
Which is correct?
a.
Y did think through the pros and cons of z-ing.
b.
Y did not think through the pros and cons of z-ing.
Y made this particular decision . . .
a.
with regard for whether z-ing aligned with his[her] personal values.
b.
without regard for whether z-ing aligned with his[her] personal values.
At the time X suggested z-ing, Y was . . .
a.
capable of thinking through his[her] choice and deciding based on the pros
and cons
b.
incapable of thinking through his[her] choice and deciding based on the pros
and cons
At the time X suggested z-ing, Y was . . .
a.
able to make a decision based on which option aligned with his[her] personal
values.
b.
unable to make a decision based on which option aligned with his[her]
personal values.
2. STUDY 2 STIMULI
a. Study 2 vignettes by condition
All vignettes begin:
Please read the following story carefully.
Marvin has been in physical therapy for ankle pain. One day his doctor asks him
whether he wishes to undergo elective surgery to repair the tendon. The doctor
explains that the surgery carries some risks, as all surgeries do, but if all goes well
it could potentially completely cure his ankle pain.
The vignettes continue according to autonomy and failure type condition:
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IMPULSE
Exercises Capacity

Mere Capacity

Lacks Capacity

Marvin feels an initial impulse
to simply say ‘no’ surgery.

Marvin feels an initial impulse
to simply say ‘yes’ to surgery.

Marvin feels an initial impulse
to simply say ‘yes’ to surgery.

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult, fully capable of making
decisions for himself and
controlling impulses when they
are inappropriate.

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult, fully capable of making
decisions for himself and
controlling impulses when they
are inappropriate.

Marvin is not able and
intelligent like most adults who
are fully capable of making
decisions for themselves: he is
completely incapable of
controlling impulses, even
when they are inappropriate.

And he does so in this instance.
Although he feels an initial
impulse to avoid surgery, he
thinks things through carefully,
and makes his decision with
careful regard for the pros and
cons, and whether surgery
aligns with his personal values
and what he really wants.
Because of this, Marvin says
‘yes’ to the surgery.

But he does not do so in this
instance. Acting on an initial
impulse to have the surgery, he
doesn’t think things through
even a little bit, and pays
absolutely no attention to the
pros and cons, or whether
surgery aligns with his personal
values and what he really
wants. He simply says ‘yes’ to
the surgery on an impulse.

So he does not do so in this
instance. Acting on an initial
impulse to have the surgery, he
doesn’t think things through
even a little bit, and pays
absolutely no attention to the
pros and cons, or whether
surgery aligns with his personal
values and what he really
wants. He simply says ‘yes’ to
the surgery on an impulse.

If he had not resisted his initial
impulse and made a decision
based on thinking things
through properly, Marvin
would have said ‘no’, despite
surgery being the right choice
for him.

If he had resisted his initial
impulse and made a decision
based on thinking things
through properly, Marvin
would have said ‘no’, as
surgery is not the right choice
for him.

If he had been able to resist his
initial impulse and make a
decision based on thinking
things through properly,
Marvin would have said ‘no’,
as surgery is not the right
choice for him.
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PEER PRESSURE
Exercises Capacity

Mere Capacity

Lacks Capacity

Marvin’s friends are really
pushy and opinionated when it
comes to medical matters, and
they think that it would be
really irresponsible for Marvin
to have the surgery.

Marvin’s friends are really
pushy and opinionated when it
comes to medical matters, and
they think that it would be
really irresponsible for Marvin
not to have the surgery.

Marvin’s friends are really
pushy and opinionated when it
comes to medical matters, and
they think that it would be
really irresponsible for Marvin
not to have the surgery.

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult, fully capable of making
decisions for himself: even if
he is under pressure from
others to make a certain choice,
he is still perfectly able to
make his own decision and
resist pressure to do things that
he doesn’t want to do or that
aren’t right for him.

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult, fully capable of making
decisions for himself: even if
he is under pressure from
others to make a certain choice,
he is still perfectly able to
make his own decision and
resist pressure to do things that
he doesn’t want to do or that
aren’t right for him.

Marvin is not able and
intelligent like most adults who
are able to make decisions for
themselves: if he is under
pressure from others to make a
certain choice, he is completely
incapable of making his own
decision and resisting pressure
to do things that he doesn’t
want to do or that aren’t right
for him.

And he does so in this instance.
Although he feels pressure
from his friends to say ‘no’ to
the surgery, he thinks things
through carefully, and makes
his decision with careful regard
for the pros and cons, and
whether surgery aligns with his
personal values and what he
really wants. Because of this,
Marvin says ‘yes’ to the
surgery.

But he does not do so in this
instance. Giving in to pressure
from his friends to have the
surgery, he doesn’t think things
through even a little bit, and
pays absolutely no attention the
pros and cons, or whether
surgery aligns with his personal
values and what he really
wants. Marvin simply says
‘yes’ to the surgery.

If he had not resisted the
pressure from his friends and
thought things through for
himself, Marvin would have
said ‘no’ even though surgery
is what he really wants.

If he had resisted the pressure
from his friends and thought
things through for himself,
Marvin would have said ‘no’,
as surgery is not what he really
wants.

So he does not do so in this
instance. Giving in to pressure
from his friends to have the
surgery, he doesn’t think things
through even a little bit, and
pays absolutely no attention the
pros and cons, or whether
surgery aligns with his personal
values and what he really
wants. Marvin simply says
‘yes’ to the surgery.
If he had been able to resist
pressure from his friends and
think things through for
himself, Marvin would have
said ‘no’, as surgery is not
what he really wants.
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UNINFORMED
Exercises Capacity

Mere Capacity

Lacks Capacity

While the doctor is explaining
some of the critical risks and
benefits of the procedure,
however, Marvin becomes
distracted by a text message,
and doesn’t hear what the
doctor is saying.

Whilst the doctor is explaining
some of the critical risks and
benefits of the procedure,
however, Marvin becomes
distracted by a text message,
and doesn’t hear what the
doctor is saying.

Whilst the doctor is explaining
some of the critical risks and
benefits of the procedure,
however, Marvin becomes
distracted by a text message,
and doesn’t hear what the
doctor is saying.

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult: he can tell that he
doesn’t know enough about the
surgery to make an informed
choice, so he is perfectly
capable of making sure he gets
the information he needs.

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult: he can tell that he
doesn’t know enough about the
surgery to make an informed
choice, so he is perfectly
capable of making sure he gets
the information he needs.

Marvin is not able and
intelligent like most adults; he
is completely incapable of
making informed decisions. So
he is completely unable to
make sure he has the
information he needs,
understand his options
properly, and make an
informed choice.

And he does so in this instance.
He tells the doctor he was
distracted, and the doctor
repeats
the
relevant
information. Now that he has
substantial information about
the procedure, Marvin makes
his decision with careful regard
for the pros and cons, and
whether surgery aligns with his
personal values and what he
really wants. Because of this,
Marvin says ‘yes’ to the
surgery.
If he had not asked the doctor
to repeat himself because he
didn’t know enough about the
surgery to make an informed
choice, Marvin would not have
realized that surgery was right
for him, and he would have
said ‘no’.

But he does not do so in this
instance. He doesn’t tell the
doctor he was distracted, and
the doctor does not repeat the
relevant information. With little
information
about
the
procedure, he does not make
his decision with regard for the
pros and cons or whether
surgery aligns with his personal
values and what he really wants.
Marvin simply says ‘yes’ to the
surgery.

So he does not do so in this
instance. He doesn’t tell the
doctor he was distracted, and
the doctor does not repeat the
relevant information. With little
information
about
the
procedure, he does not make
his decision with regard for the
pros and cons or whether
surgery aligns with his personal
values and what he really wants.
Marvin simply says ‘yes’ to the
surgery.

If he had asked the doctor to
repeat himself because he
didn’t know enough about the
surgery to make an informed
choice, Marvin would have
realized that surgery was not
right for him, and he would
have said ‘no’.

Marvin is not able and
intelligent like most adults; he
simply can’t tell that he doesn’t
know enough about the surgery
to make an informed choice, so
he is not capable of making
sure he gets the information he
needs.
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SUPERSTITION
Exercises Capacity

Mere Capacity

Lacks Capacity

Today is the 14th of April.
Marvin is superstitious about
the number 14: he thinks that
14 is his unlucky number and
that things that come up on the
14th of the month are liable to
be bad.

Today is the 14th of April.
Marvin is superstitious about
the number 14: he thinks that
14 is his lucky number and that
things that come up on the 14th
of the month are liable to be
good.

Today is the 14th of April.
Marvin is superstitious about
the number 14: he thinks that
14 is his lucky number and that
things that come up on the 14th
of the month are liable to be
good.

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult: he is perfectly capable of
distinguishing reasonable from
unreasonable ways of making
decisions and of making
decisions in a reasonable way.

Marvin is an intelligent, able
adult: he is perfectly capable
of distinguishing reasonable
from unreasonable ways of
making decisions and of
making decisions in a
reasonable way.

Marvin is not able and
intelligent like most adults: he
is completely incapable of
distinguishing reasonable from
unreasonable ways of making
decisions and of making
decisions in a reasonable way.

And he does so in this instance.
Even though fourteen is his
unlucky number, he thinks the
surgery through carefully, and
makes his decision with careful
regard for the pros and cons,
and whether surgery aligns
with his personal values and
what he really wants. Because
of this, Marvin says ‘yes’ to the
surgery.

But he does not do so in this
instance. Because fourteen is
his lucky number, he simply
says ‘yes’ to the surgery. He
doesn’t think the surgery
through even a little bit, and
pays absolutely no attention to
the pros and cons, or whether
surgery aligns with his personal
values and what he really
wants.

So he does not do so in this
instance. Because fourteen is
his lucky number, he simply
says ‘yes’ to the surgery. He
doesn’t think things through
even a little bit, and pays
absolutely no attention to the
pros and cons, or whether
surgery aligns with his personal
values and what he really
wants.

If he had made this decision in
a reasonable way by thinking it
through properly instead of
basing it entirely on
superstition, Marvin would
have realized that surgery was
not right for him, and he would
have said ‘no’.

If he had been able to
distinguish reasonable from
unreasonable ways of making
decisions and had thought this
decision through properly
instead of basing it entirely on
superstition, Marvin would
have realized that surgery was
not right for him, and he would
have said ‘no’.

If he had made this decision in
an unreasonable way by not
thinking it through properly
and instead basing it entirely
on his superstition, Marvin
would not have realized that
surgery was right for him, and
he would have said ‘no’.

b. Study 2 measures
Consent
Consent 1: The doctor had Marvin’s permission to proceed with the surgery.
Consent 2: If the doctor proceeds with the surgery now, he’ll be acting without
Marvin’s consent.
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Consent 3: Marvin’s ‘yes’ didn’t count as consent.
Morality: Under these circumstances, it would be morally wrong for the doctor to
proceed with the surgery.
Freedom: Marvin freely chose to have surgery.
Manipulation checks
Rational capacity: Marvin has the ability to make rational decisions.
Rational exercise: Marvin made this particular decision rationally.
Authentic capacity: Marvin has the ability to be true to himself when making
decisions.
Authentic exercise: When Marvin said ‘yes’ to having surgery, he was not being
true to himself.
Autonomy capacity: Marvin has the ability to shape his own life freely according to
his own values and what is right for him.
Autonomy exercise: The way Marvin made this particular decision expressed an
ability to shape his life freely according to his own values and what is right for him.
c. Study 2 attention checks
Attention Checks, Impulse Condition
1. Which is correct?
a. Marvin IS able to resist and overcome impulses.
b. Marvin IS NOT able to resist and overcome impulses.
2. Which is correct?
a. Marvin made this particular decision by thinking it through properly.
b. Marvin made this particular decision on an impulse.
3. Which is correct?
a. Having surgery WAS the right choice for Marvin.
b. Having surgery WAS NOT the right choice for Marvin.
Attention Checks, Peer Pressure Condition
1. Which is correct?
a. Marvin IS able to resist pressure from others and make decisions for
himself.
b. Marvin IS NOT able to resist pressure from others and make decisions for
himself.
2. Which is correct?
a. Marvin made this particular decision to have surgery based on pressure
from his friends.
b. Marvin made this particular decision to have surgery based on thinking it
through for himself.
3. Which is correct?
a. Having surgery WAS the right choice for Marvin.
b. Having surgery WAS NOT the right choice for Marvin.
Attention Checks, Uninformed Condition
1. Which is correct?
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a. Marvin WAS ABLE to tell that he didn't have enough information to
make an informed choice.
b. Marvin WAS NOT ABLE to tell that he didn't have enough information to
make an informed choice.
2. Which is correct?
a. In the end, Marvin made his decision with SUBSTANTIAL information
about the surgery.
b. In the end, Marvin made his decision with LITTLE information about the
surgery.
3. Which is correct?
a. Having surgery WAS the right choice for Marvin.
b. Having surgery WAS NOT the right choice for Marvin.
Attention Checks, Superstition
1. Which is correct?
a. Marvin IS capable of distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable ways
of making decisions.
b. Marvin IS NOT capable of distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable
ways of making decisions.
2. Which is correct?
a. Marvin made this particular decision by thinking it through properly.
b. Marvin made this particular decision by relying entirely on superstition.
3. Which is correct?
a. Having surgery WAS the right choice for Marvin.
b. Having surgery WAS NOT the right choice for Marvin.
3. STUDY 3 STIMULI
a. STUDY 3 Vignettes by condition
Exercises Capacity

Mere Capacity

Lacks Capacity

Jessica is an adult. Although she
is occasionally known to be rash
or impulsive, she is very able
and intelligent. Indeed, she is
perfectly capable of weighing
up pros and cons, thinking
through choices she faces, and
making decisions based on what
is best for her, which options
align with her personal values,
and what she really wants.

Jessica is an adult. Although she
is occasionally known to be rash
or impulsive, she is very able
and intelligent. Indeed, she is
perfectly capable of weighing
up pros and cons, thinking
through choices she faces, and
making decisions based on what
is best for her, which options
align with her personal values,
and what she really wants.

Jessica is an adult. Although she
is occasionally known to be rash
or impulsive, she is very able
and intelligent.

Right now she is in the hospital
recovering from surgery. She is
fully awake, and, although she
is on medication, it's only
ibuprofen and some antibiotics.
In fact, she feels calm and lucid,

Right now she is in the hospital
recovering from surgery. She is
fully awake, and, although she
is on medication, it's only
ibuprofen and some antibiotics.
In fact, she feels calm and lucid,

Right now she is in the hospital
recovering from surgery. She is
fully awake, but the medication
she is on is incredibly powerful
and is severely interfering with
her ability to think and make
decisions. Indeed, in her current
state she is completely
incapable of weighing up pros
and cons, thinking through
choices she faces, or making
decisions based on what is best
for her, which options align
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and nothing is interfering in any
way with her ability to think or
make decisions.

and nothing is interfering in any
way with her ability to think or
make decisions.

Sam is a friend of Jessica’s. He
knows that Jessica has a
diamond bracelet. Sam knows
the bracelet is very precious to
Jessica, but he thinks it would
sell for a lot of money. He goes
to the hospital to ask Jessica if
he can sell her bracelet and split
the money with her. She is not
rash on this occasion: using her
ability to make decisions
according to her own values and
what is best for her, Jessica says
‘yes’ after thinking things
through very carefully, with
careful regard for the pros and
cons and whether it’s what she
really wants.

Sam is a friend of Jessica’s. He
knows that Jessica has a
diamond bracelet. Sam knows
the bracelet is very precious to
Jessica, but he thinks it would
sell for a lot of money. He goes
to the hospital to ask Jessica if
he can sell her bracelet and split
the money with her. She is rash
on this occasion: despite her
ability to make decisions
according to her own values and
what is best for her, Jessica just
says ‘yes’ to the sale without
thinking things through even a
little bit, and with absolutely no
regard for the pros and cons or
whether it’s what she really
wants.

with her personal values, or
what she really wants.
Sam is a friend of Jessica’s. He
knows that Jessica has a
diamond bracelet. Sam knows
the bracelet is very precious to
Jessica, but he thinks it would
sell for a lot of money. He goes
to the hospital to ask Jessica if
he can sell her bracelet and split
the money with her. Because of
her current medicated state, she
completely lacks the ability to
make decisions according to her
own values and what is best for
her, so Jessica says ‘yes’ to the
sale without thinking things
through even a little bit, and
with absolutely no regard for
the pros and cons, or whether
it’s what she really wants.

ALL CONDITIONS continue as follows:
Even though she said ‘yes’, Sam suspects that Jessica will actually be really sad later about parting
with the bracelet. But he just wants to make money for himself. So he takes the bracelet from Jessica
and puts it up for sale online.
A woman named Melanie, a complete stranger, sees the ad. She tells Sam that she’s interested in
buying the bracelet and asks how he came by it. Sam doesn’t tell her the real story. Instead, he gives a
really convincing story about purchasing it years ago from a jewelry store. Melanie has no reason to
doubt his story.
Melanie decides to buy the bracelet. She transfers the money to Sam. Sam receives the payment and
then mails Melanie the bracelet, which arrives safely by courier two days later.

b. Study 3 measures
Consent
Consent 1: Sam had Jessica’s permission to proceed with the sale.
Consent 2: When Sam proceeded with the sale, he was acting without
Jessica’s consent.
Consent 3: Jessica’s ‘yes’ didn’t count as consent.
Morality: Under these circumstances, it was morally wrong for Sam to proceed with
selling the bracelet.
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Ownership, binary: Who is the rightful owner of the bracelet? Multiple Choice:
Jessica/Melanie
Ownership Rights
Assume that Melanie could return the bracelet to Jessica and get her money back.
Do you agree with the following statement?
Ownership 1: The bracelet does not truly belong to Melanie.
Ownership 2: Even if Melanie was told about the bracelet's true history, it
would be morally acceptable for her to keep the bracelet if that's what she
wanted to do.
Ownership 3: If Melanie was told about the bracelet’s true history, it
wouldn’t just be nice of her to give the bracelet back to Jessica: it would be
her moral duty to give it back.
Ownership 4: Melanie should be forced to return the bracelet.
Ownership 5: A good law would require the bracelet to be returned to Jessica
under these circumstances.
Right choice: Saying ‘yes’ to selling the bracelet was probably the right choice for
Jessica at the time.
Freedom: Jessica freely chose to sell her bracelet.
Manipulation checks
Rational capacity: When Sam asked whether he could sell the bracelet,
Jessica had the ability to make a rational decision.
Rational exercise: Jessica made the decision to say ‘yes’ rationally.
Authentic capacity: Jessica had the ability to be true to herself when making
a decision about whether to let Sam sell the bracelet.
Authentic exercise: When Jessica said ‘yes’ to Sam’s selling the bracelet, she
was not being true to herself.
Autonomy capacity: Marvin has the ability to shape his own life freely
according to his own values and what is right for him.
Autonomy exercise: The way Marvin made this particular decision expressed
an ability to shape his life freely according to his own values and what is right
for him.
c. Study 3 attention checks
Capacity Check: Which is correct?
a. Jessica’s medication interfered with her ability to think.
b. Jessica’s medication DID NOT interfere with her ability to think.
Exercise Check: Which is correct?
a. Jessica said 'yes' WITH regard for whether she really wanted to sell the
bracelet.
b. Jessica said 'yes' WITHOUT regard for whether she really wanted to sell the
bracelet
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